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Fiscal	  and	  regulatory	  instruments	  for	  clean	  technology	  development	  in	  the	  
European	  Union	  	  	  
Antoine	  Dechezleprêtre	  (LSE)a	  &	  David	  Popp	  (Syracuse	  University	  and	  NBER)b	  	  	  
Key	  lessons	  for	  policymakers	  
	  
• European	  countries	  currently	  emphasize	  technology	  deployment	  over	  direct	  R&D	  support.	  Current	  efforts	  on	  deployment	  should	  be	  augmented	  with	  additional	  R&D	  support.	  
• Given	  that	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  we	  have	  hit	  diminishing	  returns	  to	  energy	  R&D	  funding,	  we	  recommend	  an	  increase	  of	  public	  R&D	  funding	  for	  low	  carbon	  technologies.	  The	  IEA	  estimates	  that	  public	  R&D	  spending	  needs	  to	  at	  least	  double	  to	  achieve	  significant	  carbon	  emissions	  reductions.	  
• Increased	  funding	  should	  be	  gradual	  and	  consistent	  to	  avoid	  adjustment	  costs.	  A	  doubling	  of	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  over	  10	  years	  corresponds	  to	  what	  was	  observed	  between	  2001	  and	  2011	  and	  thus	  seems	  achievable.	  
• To	  signal	  long-­‐term	  commitments	  to	  energy	  R&D	  funding,	  we	  recommend	  directing	  10%	  of	  the	  planned	  EU-­‐ETS	  auctioned	  allowances	  revenues	  until	  2025	  to	  R&D	  funding.	  This	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  doubling	  of	  EU	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  10	  years	  suggested	  above.	  	  	  
• Public	  R&D	  efforts	  should	  focus	  on	  technologies	  central	  to	  any	  decarbonisation	  pathway	  and	  have	  a	  strong	  public	  good	  component,	  such	  as	  CCS,	  energy	  storage,	  smart	  grids,	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  infrastructure	  for	  electric	  vehicles.	  
• Because	  emissions	  standards	  and	  permits	  markets	  favour	  innovation	  in	  technologies	  that	  are	  closest	  to	  the	  market,	  public	  R&D	  efforts	  should	  in	  contrast	  support	  the	  development	  of	  technologies	  further	  from	  market	  that	  nonetheless	  have	  long	  term	  potential.	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Introduction	  	  On	  23	  October	  2014	  European	  Union	  leaders	  adopted	  a	  commitment	  to	  reduce	  domestic	  greenhouse	  gas	  (GHG)	  emissions	  by	  40%	  in	  2030	  relative	  to	  1990.	  In	  2012,	  GHG	  emissions	  were	  19%	  lower	  than	  in	  1990	  at	  4.5	  Gt	  CO2eq.	  The	  additional	  reduction	  thus	  represents	  a	  significant	  challenge.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  objective	  while	  meeting	  growing	  energy	  demand,	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  mix	  of	  what	  existing	  technologies	  are	  used	  across	  Europe	  are	  needed.	  For	  this	  to	  happen	  at	  a	  reasonable	  cost	  for	  the	  economy	  requires	  decreasing	  the	  cost	  of	  clean	  technologies	  and	  developing	  new	  breakthrough	  technologies.	  This	  in	  turn	  depends	  upon	  investment	  in	  innovation	  activities.	  According	  to	  the	  last	  IPCC	  report,	  future	  investments	  in	  research,	  development	  and	  demonstration	  (RD&D)	  will	  be	  the	  determining	  factor	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  emissions	  reductions	  policies.	  For	  example,	  the	  unavailability	  of	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  technologies	  would	  substantially	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  any	  climate	  change	  policy1.	  The	  influence	  of	  technology	  on	  costs	  moreover	  increases	  with	  the	  ambition	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  goal	  (IPCC,	  2014).	  Importantly,	  the	  diversity	  of	  energy	  uses,	  systems,	  resources	  and	  national	  contexts	  means	  that	  addressing	  climate	  change	  and	  other	  environmental	  issues	  will	  require	  innovation	  across	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  existing	  and	  potential	  clean	  technologies.	  The	  cost	  of	  existing	  environment-­‐friendly	  technologies,	  such	  as	  wind	  turbines	  and	  SO2	  scrubbers,	  needs	  to	  be	  brought	  down	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  deployed	  on	  a	  large	  scale,	  while	  fundamental	  research	  needs	  to	  advance	  on	  the	  frontiers	  of	  technologies	  such	  as	  smart	  grids	  or	  energy	  storage.	  	  Yet,	  despite	  these	  pressing	  challenges,	  European	  companies	  in	  the	  electricity	  production	  sector	  –	  the	  largest	  GHG	  emissions	  emitter	  in	  Europe,	  with	  33%	  of	  European	  emissions	  in	  2012	  –	  spend	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  their	  turnover	  on	  innovation,	  against	  10-­‐15%	  in	  IT	  or	  pharmaceuticals	  (see	  Figure	  1),	  suggesting	  that	  the	  incentives	  to	  conduct	  RD&D	  of	  new	  or	  enhanced	  low	  carbon	  technologies	  and	  their	  associated	  systems	  and	  processes	  might	  not	  be	  in	  place.	  This	  low	  intensity	  of	  R&D	  in	  the	  electricity	  production	  sector	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  high	  development	  costs,	  long	  development	  timescales,	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  good	  produced	  and	  regulatory	  uncertainty.	  Importantly,	  the	  public	  sector	  does	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Unavailability	  of	  CCS	  would	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  450ppm	  CO2-­‐eq	  policy	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  1.5	  to	  3.5	  and	  of	  a	  550ppm	  CO2-­‐eq	  policy	  by	  20%	  to	  70%	  (see	  Kriegler	  et	  al.,	  2014).	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seem	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  private	  investment:	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  in	  Europe	  represent	  less	  than	  0.1%	  of	  GDP	  in	  almost	  all	  European	  countries	  and	  account	  for	  less	  that	  5%	  of	  total	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  on	  average.	  	  	  
Figure	  1	  -­‐	  R&D	  expenditure	  by	  top	  1000	  European	  companies	  in	  different	  sectors	  
as	  %	  of	  sales,	  2012	  
	  Source:	  EU	  Joint	  Research	  Centre	  on	  Industrial	  Investment	  and	  Innovation,	  R&D	  Scoreboard	  2013	  	  	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  policy	  note	  is	  to	  investigate	  whether	  the	  current	  level	  of	  public	  support	  to	  environment-­‐friendly	  technologies	  is	  sufficient	  to	  allow	  European	  countries	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  multiple	  challenges	  posed	  by	  climate	  change	  and	  other	  environmental	  concerns	  and	  to	  discuss	  the	  policy	  interventions	  that	  might	  be	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  drive	  forward	  clean	  energy	  technology	  investments	  in	  Europe.	  We	  first	  lay	  out	  the	  justifications	  for	  government	  support	  to	  clean	  R&D	  activity	  at	  the	  various	  stages	  of	  technology	  development,	  discussing	  particular	  features	  of	  clean	  technologies	  that	  justify	  policy	  intervention.	  We	  present	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  various	  policies	  on	  the	  development	  of	  clean	  technologies	  and	  use	  this	  to	  identify	  what	  the	  appropriate	  policy	  mix	  should	  look	  like.	  We	  present	  an	  overview	  of	  policies	  currently	  in	  place	  to	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support	  the	  development	  of	  clean	  technologies	  across	  Europe	  and	  compare	  the	  current	  policy	  landscape	  to	  the	  appropriate	  policy	  portfolio.	  This	  comparison	  allows	  us	  to	  provide	  some	  practical	  steps	  for	  reform.	  	  Our	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  current	  low	  price	  of	  carbon	  in	  Europe	  is	  a	  major	  barrier	  to	  clean	  technology	  development.	  The	  new	  commitments	  for	  2030	  as	  well	  as	  the	  planned	  Market	  Stability	  Reserve	  are	  steps	  in	  the	  right	  direction,	  but	  are	  unlikely	  to	  affect	  prices	  much	  in	  the	  next	  decade.	  Moreover,	  market-­‐based	  policies	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  ETS	  favour	  technologies	  that	  are	  close	  to	  the	  market.	  The	  combination	  of	  low	  prices,	  political	  constraints	  on	  future	  emissions	  prices	  and	  well-­‐known	  innovation	  market	  failures	  justify	  strong	  policies	  directly	  targeted	  at	  clean	  technology	  development.	  Thus	  we	  recommend	  a	  gradual	  increase	  of	  public	  R&D	  funding	  for	  low	  carbon	  technologies.	  The	  IEA	  has	  estimated	  that	  public	  R&D	  spending	  in	  OECD	  countries	  need	  to	  at	  least	  double	  to	  achieve	  significant	  carbon	  emissions	  reductions.	  If	  possible,	  commitments	  to	  fund	  R&D	  should	  have	  a	  long-­‐term	  commitment	  (until	  at	  least	  2030)	  just	  like	  carbon	  emission	  caps.	  Policy	  stability	  is	  important	  for	  companies,	  universities	  and	  other	  research	  stakeholders	  to	  make	  long-­‐term	  predictions	  on	  innovation	  needs.	  Revenues	  from	  auctioned	  carbon	  permits	  could	  provide	  a	  source	  of	  sustained	  funding	  for	  low	  carbon	  R&D	  with	  the	  necessary	  long-­‐term	  commitment.	  In	  fact,	  directing	  10%	  of	  the	  planned	  auctioned	  allowances	  revenues	  until	  2025	  to	  R&D	  funding	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  doubling	  of	  EU	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  suggested	  above	  in	  10	  years.	  With	  30%	  of	  global	  innovation	  activity	  towards	  low-­‐carbon	  technologies	  currently	  occurring	  in	  European	  countries2,	  the	  EU	  cannot	  just	  rely	  on	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  Japan	  or	  the	  US	  to	  innovate	  and	  then	  transfer	  the	  technologies.	  Moreover,	  European	  countries	  have	  so	  far	  been	  clearly	  emphasizing	  technology	  deployment	  over	  direct	  R&D	  support.	  Yet,	  even	  as	  the	  costs	  of	  renewables	  begin	  to	  fall,	  technical	  barriers	  to	  deployment	  remain,	  suggesting	  that	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  R&D	  is	  needed.	  In	  this	  respect,	  EU	  institutions	  and	  governments	  should	  focus	  their	  efforts	  on	  technologies	  that	  are	  central	  to	  any	  decarbonisation	  pathway	  and	  have	  a	  strong	  public	  good	  component:	  CCS,	  energy	  storage,	  smart	  grids,	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  infrastructure	  for	  electric	  vehicles.	  Since	  the	  incentives	  to	  subsidize	  R&D	  are	  much	  higher	  for	  Europe	  as	  a	  whole	  than	  for	  individual	  European	  countries,	  we	  call	  for	  a	  stronger	  involvement	  of	  European	  institutions	  in	  public	  R&D	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  OECD	  online	  Patent	  Statistics,	  "Patents	  in	  environment-­‐related	  technologies”	  section,	  at	  https://stats.oecd.org/	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clean	  technologies.	  Finally,	  our	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  in	  a	  context	  of	  high	  general	  public	  spending,	  regulatory	  instruments,	  such	  as	  technological	  standards,	  may	  become	  increasingly	  attractive,	  provided	  they	  are	  tied	  to	  direct	  R&D	  support	  for	  technologies	  that	  have	  longer	  term	  potential.	  	  
	  
I.	  The	  case	  for	  government	  intervention	  to	  support	  clean	  technology	  development	  	  In	  this	  section	  we	  explain	  why	  economic	  theory	  justifies	  public	  support	  to	  technology	  development,	  and	  particularly	  so	  regarding	  technologies	  with	  an	  environmental	  benefit.	  For	  climate	  change,	  examples	  of	  such	  technologies	  include	  alternative	  energy	  sources,	  capturing	  methane	  gas	  from	  landfills,	  and	  carbon	  capture	  and	  sequestration.	  Technological	  development	  is	  understood	  as	  encompassing	  not	  only	  upstream	  R&D	  activity	  but	  also	  technology	  deployment	  all	  the	  way	  to	  large	  scale	  commercial	  diffusion.	  To	  consider	  the	  incentives	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  that	  firms	  have	  to	  develop	  and	  deploy	  environmental	  technologies,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  first	  consider	  the	  incentives	  faced	  for	  the	  development	  and	  deployment	  of	  new	  technologies	  in	  general.	  	  
A. The	  main	  stages	  in	  technology	  development	  	  Technological	  change	  is	  a	  complex	  process,	  encompassing	  both	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  ideas	  (e.g.	  invention	  and	  innovation)	  as	  well	  of	  the	  diffusion	  and	  adoption	  of	  new	  technologies	  throughout	  the	  economy.	  Throughout	  this	  process,	  feedbacks	  between	  the	  various	  stages	  of	  technological	  change	  exist	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  For	  example,	  experience	  acquired	  during	  the	  commercialization	  process	  usually	  influences	  subsequent	  product	  innovation.	  Yet,	  at	  each	  stage,	  incentives,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  prices	  or	  regulations,	  affect	  the	  development	  and	  adoption	  of	  new	  technologies.	  These	  multiple	  feedbacks	  in	  the	  innovation	  chain	  imply	  that	  if	  the	  right	  incentives	  are	  not	  in	  place	  at	  a	  given	  stage	  (in	  particular	  through	  public	  policies,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  below),	  this	  will	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  all	  stages.	  Importantly,	  successful	  innovation	  requires	  an	  ecosystem,	  made	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  (entrepreneurs,	  technology	  firms,	  capital),	  academia	  (research	  universities,	  technical	  training	  schools)	  and	  multiple	  government	  institutions	  (to	  ensure	  regulation,	  policy	  and	  public	  funding).	  While	  not	  all	  European	  countries	  may	  individually	  possess	  a	  fully-­‐
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functioning	  innovation	  ecosystem,	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  whole	  does	  possess	  all	  the	  ingredients	  necessary	  to	  carry	  out	  successful	  technological	  change,	  although	  some	  of	  the	  stages	  of	  technology	  development	  may	  be	  less	  relevant	  for	  some	  countries	  than	  for	  others.	  For	  example,	  it	  might	  be	  relevant	  for	  small	  or	  lower	  income	  countries	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  diffusion	  stages	  of	  technological	  development	  and	  leave	  earlier	  stages	  to	  more	  advanced	  economies.	  	  	  
Figure	  2	  –	  The	  main	  stages	  of	  technological	  development	  	  
	   	  Source:	  IEA	  (2008),	  adopted	  and	  modified	  from	  Grubb	  (2004).	  	  	  	  
B. The	  rationale	  for	  government	  intervention	  to	  support	  innovation	  in	  clean	  
technologies	  	  At	  all	  three	  stages	  of	  technological	  development,	  market	  forces	  provide	  insufficient	  incentives	  for	  investment	  in	  either	  the	  development	  or	  diffusion	  of	  environmentally-­‐friendly	  technologies.	  Economists	  point	  to	  two	  principal	  market	  failures	  as	  the	  explanations	  for	  underinvestment	  in	  environmental	  R&D.	  These	  market	  failures	  provide	  the	  motivation	  for	  government	  policy	  designed	  to	  increase	  such	  research.	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Some of the technologies needed for the BLUE scenario are not yet available for deployment 
(e.g. third generation, ultra-high efficiency or ultra-low cost PV devices and fourth generation 
nuclear power). Many others require further refinement and cost reductions before they can be fully 
commercialised (e.g. CCS and offshore wind). A huge effort of RD&D will therefore be needed for 
both groups. However, public energy RD&D spending today, at some USD 10-11 billion per year, is in 
real terms about half the level it was 25 years ago. Governments have made commitments to 
increase public RD&D and some countries indeed increased investment, but overall goals have not 
yet been fully realised. Private sector RD&D in energy technology exceeds public investment, at 
USD 40-60 billion per year (but only partly related to clean energy). At the moment it is difficult to 
set a particular target, but it is clear that a major acceleration in RD&D effort is needed, as well as 
more international co-operation and a higher effectiveness of the investment.5 The call by the 
European Commission to double public RD&D by 2012 and again by 2020 is indicative of the effort 
that will be required (see also Section 4).  



































Source: IEA (2008), Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 (adopted and modified from Grubb, 2004 and Foxon, 2003). 
Key point: Both technology push and market pull is often necessary to develop and deploy technologies 
                                                           
5 Estimates of total investment needed in clean energy give the same picture. According to New Energy Finance, clean 
energy investments (in renewables, excluding large-scale hydro, and efficiency) increased in 2004-07 from USD 33 to 
148 billion. The IEA has computed that some USD 380-540 billion is needed each year between 2008 and 2030. Again, this 
would imply approximately a threefold increase compared to recent levels. 
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  A	  first	  market	  failure,	  which	  compounds	  innovation	  activity	  at	  all	  stages	  of	  clean	  technological	  change,	  is	  the	  traditional	  problem	  of	  environmental	  externalities.	  When	  pollution	  can	  be	  emitted	  freely,	  firms	  and	  consumers	  lack	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  use	  of	  emissions‐reducing	  and	  other	  environmentally	  friendly	  technologies.	  Thus,	  without	  appropriate	  policy	  interventions,	  the	  market	  for	  technologies	  that	  reduce	  emissions	  will	  be	  limited,	  reducing	  incentives	  to	  diffuse	  such	  technologies	  and	  hence	  to	  develop	  them	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  underinvestment	  extends	  to	  technologies	  with	  both	  private	  and	  public	  benefits,	  such	  as	  energy	  efficient	  technologies	  that	  reduce	  a	  firm’s	  costs	  as	  well	  as	  reducing	  the	  resulting	  emissions	  from	  energy	  consumption,	  The	  market	  failure	  problem	  simply	  means	  that	  individuals	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  social	  benefits	  of	  using	  technologies	  that	  reduce	  emissions,	  so	  that	  firms	  underinvest	  in	  energy	  efficient	  technologies.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  innovation	  activities	  are	  driven	  primarily	  by	  expectations	  about	  future	  environmental	  regulations	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  future	  policies	  represents	  a	  clear	  barrier	  to	  technology	  development.	  	  	  The	  second	  market	  failure3	  pertaining	  to	  clean	  technology	  development	  is	  the	  public	  goods	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Geroski	  1995),	  which	  impedes	  technological	  change	  at	  the	  R&D	  stage.	  In	  most	  cases,	  new	  technologies	  must	  be	  made	  available	  to	  the	  public	  for	  the	  inventor	  to	  reap	  the	  rewards	  of	  invention.	  However,	  by	  making	  new	  inventions	  public,	  some	  (if	  not	  all)	  of	  the	  knowledge	  embodied	  in	  the	  invention	  becomes	  public	  knowledge.	  This	  public	  knowledge	  may	  lead	  to	  additional	  innovations,	  or	  even	  to	  copies	  of	  the	  current	  innovations.4	  These	  knowledge	  spillovers	  provide	  benefit	  to	  the	  public	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  not	  to	  the	  innovator.	  As	  a	  result,	  private	  firms	  do	  not	  have	  incentives	  to	  provide	  the	  socially	  optimal	  level	  of	  research	  activity.	  Economists	  studying	  the	  returns	  to	  research	  consistently	  find	  that	  knowledge	  spillovers	  result	  in	  a	  wedge	  between	  private	  and	  social	  rates	  return	  to	  R&D5.	  Typical	  results	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This	  section	  draws	  heavily	  on	  Jaffe	  (2012).	  4	  Intellectual	  property	  rights,	  such	  as	  patents,	  are	  designed	  to	  protect	  inventors	  from	  such	  copies.	  However,	  their	  effectiveness	  varies	  depending	  on	  the	  ease	  in	  which	  inventors	  may	  “invent	  around”	  the	  patent	  by	  making	  minor	  modifications	  to	  an	  invention.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Levin	  et	  al.	  (1987).	  5	  Examples	  of	  such	  studies	  include	  Mansfield	  (1977,	  1996),	  Pakes	  (1985),	  Jaffe	  (1986),	  Griliches	  (1992),	  Hall	  (1996),	  and	  Jones	  and	  Williams	  (1998).	  These	  studies	  typically	  construct	  a	  pool	  of	  “external”	  R&D	  available	  to	  a	  firm	  by	  weighting	  other	  firms’	  R&D	  by	  geographical	  or	  technological	  distance,	  and	  identify	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  external	  knowledge	  pool	  of	  firms’	  productivity.	  
	   8	  
include	  marginal	  social	  rates	  of	  return	  between	  30	  and	  50	  percent.	  In	  comparison,	  estimates	  of	  private	  marginal	  rates	  of	  return	  on	  investments	  range	  from	  7	  to	  15	  percent	  (Hall	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Since	  firms	  make	  investment	  decisions	  based	  on	  their	  private	  returns,	  the	  wedge	  between	  private	  and	  social	  rates	  of	  return	  suggests	  socially	  beneficial	  research	  opportunities	  are	  being	  ignored	  by	  firms	  because	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  fully	  capture	  the	  rewards	  of	  such	  innovations.6	  Recent	  evidence	  further	  shows	  that	  knowledge	  spillovers	  are	  particularly	  high	  for	  clean	  technologies,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  wedge	  between	  private	  and	  social	  rates	  of	  return	  in	  environmental	  technologies	  might	  be	  particularly	  high.	  	  	   Box	  1	  –	  Knowledge	  spillovers	  from	  clean	  technologies	  	  Dechezleprêtre	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  investigates	  the	  magnitude	  of	  knowledge	  spillovers	  from	  clean	  technologies	  in	  the	  electricity	  production	  and	  the	  transportation	  sectors	  and	  has	  found	  evidence	  that	  clean	  patents	  generate	  larger	  knowledge	  spillovers	  than	  the	  dirty	  technologies	  they	  replace.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  knowledge	  spillovers	  in	  clean	  technologies	  is	  comparable	  to	  that	  found	  in	  other	  emerging	  technological	  fields	  such	  as	  IT	  or	  nanotechnology.	  This	  means	  that	  underinvestment	  in	  innovation	  due	  to	  knowledge	  externalities	  might	  be	  particularly	  high	  for	  clean	  technologies	  (see	  Figure	  3).	  Moreover,	  while	  knowledge	  spillovers	  often	  have	  a	  strong	  local	  component,	  Dechezleprêtre	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  show	  that	  spillovers	  are	  highly	  prevalent	  across	  European	  Union	  countries.	  While	  globally	  50%	  of	  knowledge	  spillovers	  in	  clean	  technologies	  occur	  within	  the	  country	  of	  the	  inventor,	  this	  share	  is	  much	  smaller	  for	  many	  small	  open	  European	  countries:	  25%	  for	  France,	  17%	  for	  the	  UK,	  10%	  for	  the	  Netherlands.	  For	  Europe	  as	  a	  whole,	  however,	  (ie	  considering	  Europe	  as	  a	  single	  entity)	  61%	  of	  spillovers	  occur	  domestically.	  As	  such,	  coordination	  of	  European	  Union	  research	  policy	  is	  theoretically	  justified	  and	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  European	  institutions	  –	  such	  as	  the	  European	  Research	  Executive	  Agency,	  the	  European	  Research	  Council	  or	  the	  Innovation	  and	  Networks	  Executive	  Agency	  –	  to	  fund	  R&D,	  just	  like	  public	  R&D	  in	  the	  US	  is	  funded	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A	  central	  problem	  in	  the	  spillovers	  literature	  is	  that	  firm	  performance	  is	  affected	  by	  two	  countervailing	  “spillovers”:	  a	  positive	  effect	  from	  knowledge	  spillovers	  and	  a	  negative	  business	  stealing	  effects	  from	  product	  market	  rivals.	  Bloom	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  incorporate	  these	  two	  types	  of	  spillovers	  and	  show	  that	  technology	  spillovers	  quantitatively	  dominate,	  so	  that	  the	  gross	  social	  returns	  to	  R&D	  are	  at	  least	  twice	  as	  high	  as	  the	  private	  returns	  even	  when	  taking	  product	  rivalry	  into	  account.	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the	  federal	  government	  rather	  than	  by	  individual	  states.	  	  
Figure	  3:	  Knowledge	  spillovers	  from	  clean,	  dirty	  and	  other	  emerging	  fields	  
	  Note:	  the	  y-­‐axis	  measures	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  intensity	  of	  knowledge	  spillovers,	  as	  measured	  by	  patent	  citations,	  between	  various	  technologies	  and	  the	  average	  innovation	  patented	  in	  the	  economy.	  For	  example	  clean	  electricity	  technologies	  induce	  about	  20%	  spillovers	  than	  the	  average	  innovation.	  	  	  	  	  A	  related	  market	  failure	  associated	  with	  technological	  change	  is	  learning-­‐by-­‐doing.	  It	  has	  been	  empirically	  demonstrated	  that	  production	  costs	  tend	  to	  decrease	  as	  the	  volume	  of	  production	  increases	  (Arrow,	  1962).	  Learning	  curve	  studies	  typically	  find	  faster	  learning	  for	  younger	  technologies,	  with	  estimates	  of	  learning	  rate	  revolving	  around	  15-­‐20%	  (so	  that	  production	  costs	  decrease	  by	  15-­‐20%	  for	  a	  doubling	  of	  production)	  for	  alternative	  energy	  sources	  such	  as	  wind	  and	  solar	  energy	  (McDonald	  and	  Schrattenholzer,	  2001).	  Hence,	  the	  early	  producers	  of	  a	  technology	  generate	  knowledge	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developed	  by	  someone	  else	  (a	  ‘second	  mover	  advantage’)	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  knowledge	  spillovers.	  	  The	  combination	  of	  the	  environmental	  market	  failure	  and	  the	  knowledge	  market	  failure	  creates	  the	  famous	  ‘double	  externality	  problem’	  whereby	  investment	  in	  clean	  R&D	  is	  doubly	  underprovided	  by	  the	  market,	  making	  policies	  to	  support	  clean	  technology	  development	  all	  the	  more	  necessary.	  However,	  the	  literature	  has	  identified	  many	  other	  market	  failures	  and	  barriers	  that	  mean	  that	  left	  to	  its	  own	  devices,	  the	  private	  sector	  will	  tend	  to	  underinvest	  in	  clean	  technologies	  at	  pre-­‐commercial	  stages	  of	  development.	  In	  particular,	  even	  if	  problems	  associated	  with	  incomplete	  appropriability	  of	  the	  returns	  to	  R&D	  are	  solved,	  it	  may	  still	  be	  difficult	  or	  costly	  to	  finance	  such	  investments	  using	  capital	  from	  sources	  external	  to	  the	  firm.	  Information	  about	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  new	  technology	  is	  held	  by	  the	  innovator,	  creating	  a	  fundamental	  asymmetry	  of	  information	  that	  pushes	  investors	  to	  favour	  projects	  with	  least	  uncertain	  and	  short-­‐term	  benefits	  (Hall	  and	  Lerner,	  2010).	  These	  imperfections	  in	  the	  market	  for	  capital	  decrease	  the	  incentives	  for	  financing	  technological	  development.	  Similarly,	  lock-­‐in	  and	  path	  dependency	  of	  previous	  investments	  due	  to	  long-­‐lived	  capital	  (like	  power	  plants),	  market	  power,	  network	  effects	  and	  dominant	  designs	  impede	  technology	  development.	  These	  additional	  market	  failures	  help	  explaining	  what	  has	  become	  known	  as	  the	  “technology	  valley	  of	  death”	  (see	  Grubb	  (2013)	  for	  a	  extensive	  presentation	  of	  the	  issue).	  	  Of	  course,	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  clean	  technologies	  and	  different	  sets	  of	  market	  failures	  apply	  to	  different	  technologies.	  For	  example,	  knowledge	  market	  failures	  are	  highest	  in	  technologies	  that	  are	  newer,	  like	  solar	  PV,	  and	  have	  wide	  applications	  across	  the	  board,	  like	  energy	  storage,	  while	  they	  are	  much	  smaller	  in	  magnitude	  in	  mature	  technologies	  such	  as	  hydro	  power	  (Dechezleprêtre	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Hence,	  the	  case	  for	  policy	  support	  is	  stronger	  for	  the	  former	  types	  of	  technologies	  than	  for	  the	  latter.	  	  	  	  
II.	  Policies	  to	  support	  clean	  technology	  development	  	  The	  combination	  of	  environmental	  externalities	  and	  knowledge	  market	  failures	  suggests	  two	  possible	  avenues	  through	  which	  policy	  can	  encourage	  the	  development	  of	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environment-­‐friendly	  technologies:	  correcting	  the	  environmental	  externality	  and/or	  correcting	  knowledge	  market	  failures.	  Because	  knowledge	  market	  failures	  apply	  generally	  across	  technologies,	  policies	  addressing	  knowledge	  market	  failures	  may	  be	  general,	  addressing	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  Examples	  include	  patent	  protection,	  R&D	  tax	  credits,	  and	  funding	  for	  generic	  basic	  research.	  Such	  policies	  focus	  on	  the	  overall	  rate	  of	  innovation	  –	  how	  much	  innovative	  activity	  takes	  place.	  In	  contrast,	  policies	  aimed	  specifically	  at	  the	  environment	  focus	  on	  the	  direction	  of	  innovation.	  Although	  the	  latter	  group	  of	  policies	  includes	  policies	  regulating	  externalities,	  such	  as	  a	  carbon	  tax	  or	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  system,	  it	  also	  includes	  environmental	  and	  energy	  policies	  using	  more	  general	  R&D	  policy	  mechanisms	  with	  a	  specific	  focus	  on	  the	  environment,	  such	  as	  targeted	  government	  subsidies	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  alternative	  energy	  and	  targeted	  funding	  for	  basic	  and	  applied	  research.	  As	  we’ll	  discuss	  below,	  such	  policies	  may	  be	  justified	  by	  differences	  in	  the	  returns	  to	  different	  types	  of	  R&D,	  or	  by	  evidence	  of	  behavioural	  anomalies	  that	  limit	  the	  diffusion	  of	  energy	  technologies.	  	  
A.	  Addressing	  the	  environmental	  externality	  	  
The	  effects	  of	  environmental	  policy	  on	  environmental	  innovation	  The	  existence	  of	  environmental	  externalities	  requires	  public	  policies	  that	  force	  economic	  agents	  to	  “internalize”	  the	  benefits	  of	  protecting	  the	  environment.	  Environmental	  policy	  tools	  are	  usually	  grouped	  in	  two	  categories:	  market	  instruments,	  which	  establish	  a	  price	  on	  the	  externality	  (for	  example,	  a	  tax	  on	  carbon	  emissions	  or	  a	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  system),	  and	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  instruments,	  which	  impose	  limits	  on	  emissions	  of	  pollutants	  or	  require	  adoption	  of	  particular	  technical	  standards.	  By	  making	  polluting	  emissions	  costly,	  both	  types	  of	  environmental	  policies	  change	  the	  relative	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  competing	  technologies.	  For	  example,	  carbon	  taxes	  make	  coal	  relatively	  more	  expensive	  than	  natural	  gas.	  Renewable	  energy	  portfolio	  standards	  make	  alternative	  energy	  sources	  more	  attractive	  relative	  to	  carbon-­‐based	  energy.	  Thus,	  policies	  that	  force	  agents	  to	  internalize	  environmental	  externalities	  encourage	  the	  
diffusion	  of	  environmentally-­‐friendly	  technologies.	  In	  fact,	  studies	  addressing	  adoption	  of	  environmental	  technologies	  find	  that	  regulations	  dominate	  all	  other	  firm-­‐specific	  factors	  in	  explaining	  the	  gradual	  diffusion	  of	  new	  technologies.	  Examples	  include	  Kerr	  and	  Newell	  (2003)	  on	  the	  removal	  of	  lead	  from	  gasoline	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Kemp	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(1998)	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  effluent	  charges	  on	  biological	  treatment	  of	  wastewater,	  Snyder	  et	  
al.	  (2003)	  on	  the	  diffusion	  of	  membrane-­‐cell	  technology	  in	  the	  chlorine	  manufacturing	  industry,	  and	  Popp	  (2009)	  on	  NOX	  pollution	  control	  technologies	  at	  power-­‐plants.	  	  	  Environmental	  regulation	  also	  encourages	  innovation.	  Because	  R&D	  is	  a	  profit-­‐motivated	  investment	  activity,	  innovation	  responds	  to	  the	  change	  in	  the	  expected	  diffusion	  of	  technologies	  induced	  by	  environmental	  regulations	  by	  developing	  cleaner	  technologies.	  This	  notion	  of	  induced	  innovation	  (Acemoglu,	  2002;	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Hicks,	  1932)	  provides	  the	  theoretical	  background	  for	  the	  vast	  empirical	  literature	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  policy	  and	  prices	  on	  environmental	  innovation.	  This	  literature	  –	  recently	  surveyed	  in	  Popp	  et	  al.	  (2010),	  Popp	  (2010),	  and	  Ambec	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  –	  supports	  the	  conjectures	  of	  the	  induced	  innovation	  hypothesis	  and	  provides	  evidence	  on	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effects.	  These	  studies,	  highlighted	  in	  Box	  2,	  show	  that	  both	  stricter	  environmental	  policies	  and	  higher	  energy	  prices	  encourage	  additional	  innovation	  on	  clean	  technologies,	  and	  that	  the	  innovative	  response	  to	  policy	  happens	  quickly.	  For	  example,	  much	  of	  the	  innovative	  response	  to	  higher	  energy	  prices	  occurs	  within	  five	  years	  or	  less.	  When	  looking	  at	  the	  innovative	  response	  to	  environmental	  regulation,	  rather	  than	  energy	  prices,	  the	  response	  time	  is	  even	  faster.	  Popp	  (2006a)	  finds	  an	  almost	  immediate	  innovative	  response	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  clean	  air	  regulations	  in	  the	  US,	  Japan,	  and	  Germany.	  Similarly,	  Figure	  4,	  taken	  from	  Calel	  and	  Dechezleprêtre	  (2014),	  shows	  how	  the	  EU	  ETS	  has	  increased	  innovation	  activity	  in	  low-­‐carbon	  technologies	  among	  regulated	  companies.	  The	  figure	  plots	  the	  patenting	  activity	  of	  firms	  regulated	  under	  the	  EU	  ETS	  with	  that	  of	  a	  control	  group	  of	  unregulated	  but	  similar	  firms	  selected	  through	  matching	  techniques.	  The	  control	  group	  represents	  what	  would	  have	  happened,	  had	  the	  EU	  ETS	  not	  been	  implemented.	  Regulated	  and	  unregulated	  companies	  exhibit	  roughly	  comparable	  innovation	  activity	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS,	  but	  they	  start	  diverging	  quickly	  after	  the	  new	  policy	  is	  put	  in	  place.	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Figure	  4	  –	  Low	  carbon	  innovation	  activity	  of	  EU	  ETS	  regulated	  companies	  
compared	  with	  counterfactual	  scenario	  
	  Source:	  Calel	  &	  Dechezleprêtre,	  2014	  	  	  To	  sum	  up,	  there	  is	  ample	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  environmental	  regulations,	  by	  encouraging	  the	  diffusion	  of	  environmentally-­‐friendly	  technologies,	  affect	  innovation	  activity	  further	  up	  the	  technology	  supply	  chain,	  favouring	  R&D	  in	  clean	  technologies	  and	  discouraging	  it	  in	  conventional	  (polluting)	  technologies.	  The	  impact	  on	  innovation	  appears	  both	  large	  and	  rapid.	  Thus,	  environmental	  regulations	  can	  help	  economies	  break	  away	  from	  a	  polluting	  economic	  trajectory	  and	  move	  to	  a	  ‘cleaner’	  one.	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been	  shown	  to	  incentivize	  innovation.	  Johnstone	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  find	  that	  patenting	  activity	  for	  renewable	  energy	  technologies,	  measured	  by	  applications	  for	  renewable	  energy	  patents	  submitted	  to	  the	  European	  Patent	  Office	  (EPO),	  has	  increased	  dramatically	  in	  recent	  years,	  as	  both	  national	  policies	  and	  international	  efforts	  to	  combat	  climate	  change	  begin	  to	  provide	  incentives	  for	  innovation.	  Dechezleprêtre	  and	  Glachant	  (2013)	  show	  that	  every	  100	  MW	  of	  new	  wind	  power	  capacity	  installed	  in	  OECD	  countries	  induces	  3	  new	  patented	  innovations	  globally.	  Other	  studies	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  changing	  energy	  prices	  on	  innovation,	  providing	  evidence	  on	  how	  innovation	  will	  react	  to	  higher	  energy	  prices	  resulting	  from	  regulation.	  Newell	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  show	  that	  the	  energy	  efficiency	  of	  home	  appliances	  available	  for	  sale	  changed	  in	  response	  to	  energy	  prices	  between	  1958	  and	  1993.	  Suggesting	  the	  role	  that	  policy-­‐induced	  technological	  change	  may	  play	  as	  climate	  policy	  moves	  forward,	  they	  find	  that	  energy	  efficiency	  in	  1993	  would	  have	  been	  about	  one-­‐quarter	  to	  one-­‐half	  lower	  in	  air	  conditioners	  and	  gas	  water	  heaters	  if	  energy	  prices	  had	  stayed	  at	  their	  1973	  levels,	  rather	  than	  following	  their	  historical	  path.	  Both	  Popp	  (2002)	  and	  Verdolini	  and	  Galeotti	  (2011)	  find	  similar	  estimates	  of	  the	  elasticity	  of	  energy	  patenting	  activity	  with	  respect	  to	  energy	  prices	  for	  alternative	  energy	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  technologies,	  with	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  energy	  prices	  raises	  energy	  patenting	  in	  the	  long-­‐run	  by	  3.5-­‐4%.	  Aghion	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  examine	  innovation	  activity	  by	  around	  3,000	  firms	  in	  the	  car	  industry	  and	  show	  that	  firms	  tend	  to	  innovate	  more	  in	  clean	  technologies	  (ie,	  electric,	  hybrid	  and	  hydrogen	  cars)	  and	  less	  in	  dirty	  technologies	  (ie	  internal	  combustion	  engines)	  when	  they	  face	  higher	  fuel	  prices.	  A	  10%	  higher	  fuel	  price	  is	  associated	  with	  about	  10%	  more	  clean	  patents	  and	  7%	  less	  dirty	  patents.	  
	  
What	  instruments	  work	  best?	  Studies	  on	  induced	  innovation	  provide	  some	  insight	  as	  to	  the	  pace	  of	  environmental	  innovation.	  Also	  important,	  however,	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  policies	  used	  to	  stimulate	  innovation.	  Policymakers	  have	  a	  range	  of	  policy	  instruments	  available	  to	  regulate	  environmental	  quality.	  Command-­‐and-­‐control	  regulations	  direct	  a	  specific	  level	  of	  performance.	  For	  instance,	  performance	  standard	  sets	  a	  uniform	  control	  target	  for	  firms	  (such	  as	  pounds	  of	  sulfur	  dioxide	  emissions	  per	  million	  BTUs	  of	  fuel	  burned),	  but	  do	  not	  dictate	  how	  this	  target	  is	  met.	  Technology-­‐based	  standards	  specify	  the	  method,	  and	  sometimes	  the	  actual	  equipment,	  that	  firms	  must	  use	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  particular	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regulation,	  such	  as	  requiring	  that	  a	  percentage	  of	  electricity	  be	  generated	  using	  renewable	  sources.	  Market-­‐based	  policies	  establish	  a	  price	  for	  emissions,	  either	  directly	  through	  the	  use	  of	  fees,	  such	  as	  a	  carbon	  tax,	  or	  indirectly	  through	  the	  use	  of	  permits	  that	  can	  be	  bought	  and	  sold	  among	  firms,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  U.S.	  SO2	  market	  or	  the	  European	  Union’s	  Emission	  Trading	  System	  for	  carbon.	  	  Historically,	  economists	  have	  argued	  that	  market-­‐based	  policies	  provide	  greater	  incentives	  for	  innovation.	  Market-­‐based	  policies	  provide	  rewards	  for	  continuous	  improvement	  in	  environmental	  quality,	  whereas	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  policies	  penalize	  polluters	  who	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  standard,	  but	  do	  not	  reward	  those	  who	  do	  better	  than	  mandated	  (Magat,	  1978;	  Milliman	  and	  Prince,	  1989).	  However,	  more	  recent	  research	  suggest	  that	  the	  effects	  are	  more	  nuanced.	  For	  example,	  standards	  can	  be	  of	  use	  when	  behavioural	  anomalies	  result	  lead	  consumers	  paying	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  energy	  efficiency,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  box	  3.	  Similarly,	  in	  a	  recent	  review,	  Vollebergh	  and	  van	  der	  Werf	  (2014)	  show	  that	  although	  standards	  are	  often	  viewed	  by	  economists	  as	  rigid	  and	  cost-­‐inefficient	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  policy	  instruments,	  in	  appropriate	  conditions	  standards	  are	  key	  complements	  to	  market-­‐based	  instruments.	  For	  example,	  to	  promote	  the	  development	  of	  electric	  vehicles,	  charging	  stations	  must	  be	  in	  place.	  However,	  the	  private	  sector	  has	  little	  incentive	  to	  provide	  charging	  stations	  without	  existing	  demand	  from	  electric	  vehicles.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  such	  network	  externalities,	  clear	  technology	  standards	  provide	  guidance	  to	  firms	  as	  to	  the	  expected	  future	  direction	  of	  technology.	  However,	  these	  policy	  signals	  must	  be	  clear,	  or	  unintended	  consequences	  may	  result.	  See	  box	  4	  for	  an	  example.	  	  
Box	  3	  –	  The	  energy	  efficiency	  paradox	  A	  priori,	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  fuel-­‐saving	  technologies	  should	  diffuse	  even	  without	  the	  aid	  of	  policy,	  as	  they	  do	  provide	  cost-­‐saving	  benefits	  to	  the	  user.	  However,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  fuel	  prices	  do	  not	  capture	  the	  external	  costs	  of	  energy	  use,	  such	  as	  carbon	  emissions,	  energy	  prices	  alone	  will	  not	  encourage	  a	  socially	  optimal	  level	  of	  adoption	  for	  energy	  efficiency	  technologies.	  However,	  an	  important	  puzzle	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  energy	  technology	  diffusion	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  seemingly	  cost-­‐effective	  energy-­‐efficient	  technologies	  diffuse	  slowly,	  suggesting	  what	  has	  become	  to	  be	  known	  as	  an	  “energy	  efficiency	  paradox.”	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  diffusion	  is	  limited	  by	  other	  market	  failures,	  policy	  measures	  that	  simply	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increase	  the	  economic	  incentive	  to	  adopt	  environmentally-­‐friendly	  technologies	  will	  be	  insufficient.	  In	  addition,	  policies	  focused	  directly	  on	  the	  correction	  of	  adoption	  market	  failures	  can	  be	  justified.	  	  Several	  researchers	  have	  examined	  this	  energy	  efficiency	  paradox,	  offering	  explanations	  including	  consumers	  using	  high	  discount	  rates	  (Train,	  1985),	  credit-­‐constrained	  consumers	  caring	  more	  about	  up-­‐front	  costs	  than	  lifetime	  cost	  savings	  (Jaffe	  and	  Stavins,	  1994),	  agency	  problems	  such	  as	  in	  landlord/tenant	  relationships	  (Levinson	  and	  Niemann,	  2004),	  and	  uncertainty	  over	  future	  costs	  (Anderson	  and	  Newell,	  2004).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  market	  failures,	  more	  recent	  research	  addresses	  potential	  behavioural	  anomalies	  that	  may	  affect	  diffusion	  of	  energy	  efficient	  technology.	  This	  research	  combines	  psychology	  and	  economics,	  and	  notes	  cases	  where	  observed	  behaviour	  differs	  from	  what	  traditional	  economic	  models	  predict.	  Gillingham	  and	  Palmer	  (2014)	  provide	  a	  review	  of	  studies	  on	  behavioural	  economics	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  provide	  several	  examples	  of	  how	  behavioural	  economics	  can	  inform	  policy.	  For	  example,	  how	  choices	  are	  framed	  influences	  consumer	  decisions,	  suggesting	  that	  proper	  labelling	  of	  energy	  efficient	  technologies	  matters.	  Inattention	  to	  future	  costs	  may	  cause	  consumers	  to	  undervalue	  energy	  efficiency	  (Allcott	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  However,	  Houde	  (2014)	  finds	  that	  while	  Energy	  Star	  labelling	  has	  positive	  net	  benefits,	  it	  also	  crowds	  out	  other	  energy-­‐saving	  activity.	  Attention	  to	  social	  norms,	  such	  as	  providing	  information	  on	  the	  energy	  consumption	  of	  neighbours,	  can	  increase	  energy	  conservation	  (	  e.g.	  Allcott,	  2011;	  Schultz	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Similarly,	  Sallee	  (2014)	  argues	  that,	  given	  the	  time	  necessary	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  value	  of	  energy	  efficiency,	  in	  many	  cases	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  consumers	  to	  devote	  little	  attention	  to	  it.	  Such	  behavioural	  anomalies	  provide	  support	  for	  policies	  such	  as	  product	  labelling	  or	  minimum	  performance	  standards	  that	  reduce	  the	  burdens	  on	  consumers	  to	  seek	  out	  energy	  efficient	  product.	  	  
Box	  4	  –	  Policy	  signals	  and	  innovation	  on	  SO2	  scrubbers	  Examples	  from	  the	  U.S.	  market	  for	  sulphur	  dioxide	  (SO2)	  permits	  show	  the	  importance	  of	  clear	  policy	  signals	  to	  direct	  innovation.	  Popp	  (2003)	  compares	  innovation	  on	  SO2	  controls	  before	  and	  after	  the	  1990	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  (CAA)	  instituted	  permit	  trading.	  Before	  this	  Act,	  new	  plants	  were	  required	  to	  install	  a	  flue	  gas	  desulfurization	  (FGD)	  unit	  capable	  of	  removing	  90	  percent	  of	  SO2.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  innovations	  that	  occurred	  before	  the	  1990	  CAA	  focused	  on	  reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  FGD	  units,	  rather	  than	  on	  improving	  their	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environmental	  performance.	  After	  passage	  of	  the	  1990	  CAA,	  the	  nature	  of	  innovation	  changed,	  with	  a	  greater	  focus	  on	  improving	  the	  ability	  of	  FGD	  units	  to	  remove	  SO2	  from	  a	  plant’s	  emissions.	  Similarly,	  Taylor	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  note	  that	  the	  scrubber	  requirement	  led	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  patents	  on	  pre-­‐combustion	  techniques	  for	  reducing	  SO2	  emissions,	  such	  as	  cleaner	  coal.	  	  	  Moreover,	  even	  among	  market-­‐based	  policies,	  differences	  between	  policies	  matter.	  Johnstone	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  compare	  price-­‐based	  policies	  to	  promote	  renewable	  energy,	  such	  as	  tax	  credits	  and	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs7,	  to	  quantity-­‐based	  policies	  such	  as	  renewable	  energy	  mandates.	  Quantity-­‐based	  policies,	  such	  as	  renewable	  energy	  certificates,	  favor	  development	  of	  wind	  energy,	  as	  wind	  has	  the	  lowest	  cost	  and	  is	  closest	  to	  being	  competitive	  with	  traditional	  energy	  sources.	  As	  such,	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  mandate	  to	  provide	  alternative	  energy,	  firms	  focus	  their	  innovative	  efforts	  on	  the	  technology	  that	  is	  closest	  to	  market.	  In	  contrast,	  direct	  investment	  incentives	  are	  effective	  in	  supporting	  innovation	  in	  solar	  and	  waste-­‐to-­‐energy	  technologies,	  which	  are	  further	  from	  being	  competitive	  with	  traditional	  energy	  technologies.	  	  These	  results	  suggest	  particular	  challenges	  to	  policy	  makers	  who	  wish	  to	  encourage	  long-­‐run	  innovation	  for	  technologies	  that	  have	  yet	  to	  near	  market	  competitiveness.	  Economists	  generally	  recommend	  using	  broad-­‐based	  environmental	  policies,	  such	  as	  emission	  fees,	  and	  letting	  the	  market	  “pick	  winners.”	  This	  leads	  to	  lower	  compliance	  costs	  in	  the	  short-­‐run,	  as	  firms	  choose	  the	  most	  effective	  short-­‐term	  strategy.	  However,	  this	  research	  suggests	  complications	  for	  the	  long-­‐run.	  Because	  firms	  will	  focus	  on	  those	  technologies	  closest	  to	  market,	  market-­‐based	  policy	  incentives	  do	  not	  provide	  as	  much	  incentive	  for	  research	  on	  longer-­‐term	  needs.	  This	  suggests	  a	  trade-­‐off:	  directed	  policies	  such	  as	  investment	  tax	  credits	  or	  technology	  mandates	  more	  effectively	  encourage	  the	  deployment	  of	  more	  expensive	  emerging	  technologies	  that	  are	  not	  yet	  cost-­‐effective.	  However,	  this	  raises	  the	  costs	  of	  compliance,	  as	  firms	  are	  forced	  to	  use	  technologies	  that	  are	  not	  cost-­‐effective.	  One	  possible	  solution	  here	  is	  to	  use	  broad,	  market-­‐based	  policies	  to	  ensure	  short-­‐run	  compliance	  at	  low	  costs,	  and	  use	  support	  for	  the	  research	  and	  development	  process	  to	  support	  research	  on	  emerging	  technologies.	  Thus,	  the	  focus	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Feed-­‐in	  tariffs,	  used	  in	  various	  European	  countries,	  guarantee	  renewable	  energy	  producers	  a	  minimum	  price	  for	  the	  electricity	  they	  produce.	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on	  continued	  improvement	  for	  emerging	  technologies,	  rather	  than	  on	  deployment	  of	  them.	  	  Finally,	  the	  perceived	  stability	  of	  the	  policy	  is	  also	  important.	  Long-­‐term	  regulatory	  consistency	  is	  crucial	  for	  new	  technology	  development	  (Held	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  market-­‐based	  instruments	  may	  do	  a	  poor	  job	  at	  incentivizing	  R&D,	  and	  regulatory	  instruments	  may	  work	  better.	  For	  example,	  Butler	  and	  Neuhoff	  (2008)	  show	  how	  German	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs	  stimulated	  overall	  investment	  quantity	  more	  than	  UK	  renewable	  energy	  quotas	  because	  FIT	  reduced	  risks	  associated	  with	  future	  revenues	  from	  the	  project	  investment,	  therefore	  making	  it	  possible	  to	  lower	  the	  cost	  of	  project	  financing.	  Similarly,	  the	  prices	  established	  by	  market-­‐based	  policies	  must	  be	  sufficient	  to	  encourage	  innovation.	  Calel	  and	  Dechezleprêtre	  (2014)	  show	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  on	  innovation	  activity	  was	  concentrated	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  System’s	  second	  phase,	  which	  saw	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  the	  price	  of	  carbon	  on	  the	  market	  at	  about	  €30/tonne	  CO2.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  current	  level	  of	  carbon	  prices	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  might	  not	  be	  providing	  strong	  incentives	  for	  technology	  development.	  
 
The	  cross-­‐border	  effects	  of	  environmental	  policies	  The	  European	  Union	  is	  composed	  of	  28	  countries,	  most	  of	  which	  are	  small	  and	  highly	  connected	  to	  their	  neighbours	  through	  trade	  relationships.	  Therefore,	  the	  impact	  of	  environmental	  policies	  across	  borders	  is	  of	  key	  importance	  for	  these	  countries.	  Two	  recent	  empirical	  papers	  look	  at	  this	  issue.	  Dechezleprêtre	  and	  Glachant	  (2014)	  study	  the	  effect	  of	  both	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policies	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  wind	  innovation.	  While	  both	  promote	  innovation	  activity,	  they	  find	  the	  marginal	  effect	  of	  policies	  implemented	  at	  home	  to	  be	  12	  times	  higher.	  However,	  since	  the	  foreign	  market	  is	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  domestic	  market	  across	  the	  sampled	  countries,	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  foreign	  policies	  is	  on	  average	  twice	  as	  large	  as	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  domestic	  policies	  on	  innovation.	  In	  other	  words,	  wind	  power	  policies	  induce	  twice	  as	  much	  innovation	  abroad	  than	  domestically	  .8	  Similarly,	  Peters	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  find	  that	  both	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  demand-­‐pull	  policies	  are	  important	  for	  the	  development	  of	  solar	  PV	  technology.	  However,	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  foreign	  countries	  is	  smaller	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  wind	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  These	  results	  are	  valid	  on	  average	  across	  OECD	  countries	  but	  presumably	  differ	  with	  the	  size	  of	  the	  domestic	  economy.	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power,	  perhaps	  because	  barriers	  to	  international	  technology	  diffusion	  are	  larger	  in	  solar	  power.	  These	  results	  provide	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  designing	  environmental	  policies	  jointly	  at	  the	  European	  level	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  Member	  State	  level.	  Indeed,	  the	  cross-­‐country	  innovation	  spillovers	  might	  be	  viewed	  negatively	  from	  a	  narrow	  national	  perspective	  but	  are	  strongly	  positive	  from	  a	  global	  (or	  European)	  perspective.	  These	  results	  also	  constitute	  an	  incentive	  for	  Europe	  to	  push	  for	  strengthening	  of	  environmental	  regulation	  globally	  as	  this	  will	  encourage	  innovation	  in	  Europe	  by	  increasing	  the	  demand	  for	  clean	  technologies	  globally.	  	  
B.	  Addressing	  the	  innovation	  market	  failures	  	  The	  existence	  of	  knowledge	  market	  failures	  provides	  a	  rationale	  for	  public	  support	  to	  innovation.	  Note	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  a	  priori	  to	  implement	  R&D	  policies	  targeted	  specifically	  at	  clean	  technologies.	  Positive	  externalities	  in	  knowledge	  production	  may	  be	  addressed	  by	  generic	  instruments,	  such	  as	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  protection	  and	  tax	  rebates	  for	  research	  and	  development	  activities	  that	  apply	  to	  all	  industries	  equally	  (Schneider	  and	  Goulder,	  1997).	  Yet,	  in	  theory,	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  and	  subsidies	  to	  private	  R&D	  activities	  should	  reflect	  the	  size	  of	  the	  external	  spillovers	  from	  the	  research	  (Goulder	  and	  Schneider,	  1999).	  Consequently,	  the	  optimal	  level	  of	  subsidies	  for	  clean	  R&D	  crucially	  depends	  on	  the	  magnitude	  of	  knowledge	  spillovers	  from	  clean	  technologies.	  The	  recent	  results	  from	  Dechezleprêtre	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  who	  show	  that	  spillovers	  from	  clean	  technologies	  are	  particularly	  large	  suggest	  that	  specific	  support	  for	  clean	  innovation	  that	  goes	  beyond	  standard	  policies	  in	  place	  to	  internalize	  knowledge	  externalities	  is	  justified.	  As	  illustrated	  above,	  optimal	  subsidies	  for	  clean	  technologies	  are	  at	  least	  20%	  to	  30%	  higher	  than	  for	  the	  average	  innovation.	  	  
Public	  R&D	  	  Even	  when	  environmental	  regulations	  that	  encourage	  eco-­‐innovation	  are	  in	  place,	  private	  firms	  will	  focus	  research	  efforts	  on	  technologies	  that	  are	  closest	  to	  market.	  One	  of	  the	  particular	  problems	  faced	  with	  many	  climate-­‐friendly	  innovations	  is	  the	  long-­‐time	  frame	  from	  the	  initial	  invention	  to	  successful	  market	  deployment.	  Consider,	  for	  instance,	  the	  case	  of	  solar	  energy.	  Despite	  research	  efforts	  that	  began	  during	  the	  energy	  crises	  of	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the	  1970s,	  solar	  is	  still	  only	  cost	  competitive	  in	  niche	  markets,	  such	  as	  remote	  off-­‐grid	  locations.	  This	  leaves	  a	  role	  for	  government-­‐sponsored	  R&D	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  gaps,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  climate	  change,	  where	  a	  diversified	  energy	  portfolio	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  meet	  currently	  proposed	  emission	  reduction	  targets.	  Government	  investment	  in	  R&D	  plays	  several	  roles.	  First,	  government	  R&D	  can	  help	  to	  compensate	  for	  underinvestment	  by	  private	  firms.	  Unlike	  firms,	  the	  government	  is	  in	  position	  to	  consider	  social	  returns	  when	  making	  investment	  decisions.	  In	  addition,	  government	  R&D	  tends	  to	  have	  different	  objectives	  than	  private	  R&D.	  Government	  support	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  basic	  R&D,	  as	  long-­‐term	  payoffs,	  greater	  uncertainty,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  finished	  product	  at	  the	  end	  all	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  private	  firms	  to	  appropriate	  the	  returns	  of	  basic	  R&D.	  Thus,	  the	  nature	  of	  government	  R&D	  is	  important.	  For	  example,	  Popp	  (2002)	  finds	  that	  government	  energy	  R&D	  served	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  private	  energy	  R&D	  during	  the	  1970s,	  but	  as	  a	  complement	  to	  private	  energy	  R&D	  afterwards.	  One	  explanation	  given	  for	  the	  change	  in	  impact	  is	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  energy	  R&D.	  During	  the	  1970s,	  much	  government	  R&D	  funding	  went	  to	  applied	  projects	  such	  as	  the	  effort	  to	  produce	  synfuels.	  Beginning	  with	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  government	  R&D	  shifted	  towards	  a	  focus	  on	  more	  basic	  applications.	  To	  avoid	  duplicating,	  and	  potentially	  crowding-­‐out,	  private	  research	  efforts,	  government	  R&D	  support	  should	  focus	  on	  basic	  research	  or	  on	  applied	  research	  whose	  benefits	  are	  difficult	  to	  capture	  through	  market	  activity.	  For	  instance,	  improved	  electricity	  transmission	  systems	  benefit	  all	  technologies,	  and	  will	  typically	  not	  reap	  great	  rewards	  for	  the	  innovator.	  Applied	  technologies	  whose	  costs	  are	  still	  high,	  such	  as	  solar	  photovoltaics,	  will	  also	  see	  less	  private	  investment,	  as	  firms	  focus	  on	  projects	  with	  greater	  short-­‐term	  payoffs.	  In	  cases	  such	  as	  these,	  public	  R&D	  efforts	  will	  be	  important.	  The	  uncertain	  nature	  of	  long-­‐term	  research	  also	  makes	  government	  R&D	  valuable.	  In	  a	  situation	  where	  failure	  is	  more	  likely	  than	  success,	  but	  the	  successes	  will	  have	  great	  social	  value,	  government	  can	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  diversified	  R&D	  portfolio	  more	  easily	  than	  any	  one	  private	  firm.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  U.S.	  National	  Research	  Council’s	  review	  of	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  fossil	  energy	  research	  at	  DOE	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  (National	  Research	  Council,	  2001).	  Using	  both	  estimates	  of	  overall	  return	  and	  case	  studies,	  they	  concluded	  that	  there	  were	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  programs	  that	  proved	  highly	  valuable.	  Their	  estimates	  of	  returns	  suggest,	  however,	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  these	  successes	  justified	  the	  overall	  portfolio	  investment.	  These	  uncertain	  returns	  also	  suggest	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that	  government	  research	  portfolios	  should	  be	  diversified,	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  pick	  winning	  technologies	  at	  early	  stages	  of	  development.	  	  	  
IP	  systems	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  competitive	  markets	  under-­‐incentivize	  innovation	  because	  of	  the	  public-­‐good	  nature	  of	  ideas	  (Arrow,	  1962;	  Nelson,	  1959).	  Intellectual	  property	  (IP)	  rights,	  such	  as	  patents	  and	  copyrights,	  aim	  to	  incentivize	  innovation	  by	  allowing	  firms	  to	  capture	  a	  higher	  share	  of	  the	  returns	  to	  their	  research	  investments.	  Successful	  patent	  applicants	  are	  provided	  a	  temporary	  monopoly,	  lasting	  twenty	  years	  from	  the	  initial	  application	  date	  in	  the	  main	  patent	  offices	  (US,	  Europe,	  Japan…),	  in	  return	  for	  disclosing	  information	  on	  the	  innovation	  in	  the	  patent	  document,	  which	  is	  part	  of	  the	  public	  record.	  By	  granting	  this	  market	  power,	  IPR	  helps	  to	  mitigate	  potential	  losses	  from	  knowledge	  spillovers	  and	  encourage	  innovation.	  It	  is	  also	  supposed	  to	  help	  other	  inventors	  since	  innovation	  activity	  is	  cumulative	  in	  nature.	  Evidence	  shows	  that	  patents	  are	  effective	  in	  encouraging	  innovation	  in	  countries	  with	  high	  economic	  development,	  which	  would	  generally	  include	  all	  European	  economies,	  but	  that	  sectors	  that	  develop	  environmental	  technologies	  are	  not	  critically	  dependent	  on	  patent	  protection	  (see	  Box	  5).	  	  	  
Box	  5	  -­‐	  Intellectual	  property	  rights,	  innovation	  and	  technology	  diffusion	  	  Whether	  patents	  are	  effective	  in	  encouraging	  innovation	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  vast	  literature.	  Economic	  theory	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  prediction	  in	  this	  respect,	  and	  empirical	  studies	  provide	  mixed	  findings.	  For	  example	  Moser	  (2005)	  constructs	  a	  dataset	  of	  15,000	  innovations	  from	  a	  number	  of	  European	  countries	  that	  were	  displayed	  at	  two	  international	  fairs	  during	  the	  19th	  century,	  and	  finds	  that	  the	  level	  of	  innovative	  activity	  in	  these	  countries	  was	  unaffected	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  patent	  system.	  Park	  and	  Ginarte	  (1997)	  use	  data	  on	  60	  countries	  from	  1960-­‐1990	  and	  an	  index	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  IP	  rights	  and	  find	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  IP	  rights	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  R&D	  investment,	  but	  only	  in	  countries	  with	  above-­‐median	  income	  (among	  which	  all	  European	  countries	  can	  be	  found)	  and	  not	  for	  the	  less-­‐developed	  countries.	  Qian	  (2007)	  also	  finds	  that	  patent	  protection	  stimulates	  domestic	  innovation	  only	  in	  countries	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  economic	  development,	  educational	  attainment,	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and	  economic	  freedom.	  Additionally,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  optimal	  level	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  regulation	  above	  which	  further	  enhancement	  reduces	  innovative	  activities.	  	  Note	  that	  the	  above	  studies	  focus	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  patents	  on	  innovation	  throughout	  the	  entire	  economy.	  An	  important	  finding	  from	  the	  empirical	  literature	  is	  that	  some	  sectors	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  others	  to	  react	  to	  patents	  by	  increasing	  innovation,	  because	  some	  products	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  imitation	  and	  more	  easily	  codified	  in	  a	  patent	  document.	  These	  include	  the	  pharmaceutical,	  biotechnology,	  medical	  instrument	  and	  chemical	  sectors.	  In	  other	  sectors,	  patents	  are	  not	  perceived	  as	  an	  important	  means	  to	  protect	  innovation	  (Cohen	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  This	  has	  implications	  for	  environmental	  technologies,	  which	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  do	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  sectors	  most	  dependent	  on	  patent	  protection.	  Nonetheless,	  patents	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  address	  the	  imperfection	  in	  capital	  markets	  stemming	  from	  the	  asymmetry	  of	  information	  about	  the	  technology	  between	  the	  inventor	  and	  potential	  funders.	  Patents	  may	  be	  useful	  signals	  to	  investors	  that	  a	  startup	  firm	  has	  valuable	  assets	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  current	  profit	  stream.	  For	  example,	  Haeussler	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  find	  that	  European	  patent	  applications	  (but	  not	  grants)	  serve	  as	  an	  important	  signal	  to	  VC	  investors	  in	  German	  and	  British	  biotechnology	  firms.	  Similarly,	  Dechezleprêtre	  (2013)	  finds	  that	  programmes	  to	  fast-­‐track	  green	  patent	  applications	  have	  been	  particularly	  successful	  among	  start-­‐up	  companies	  currently	  raising	  capital,	  for	  which	  a	  granted	  patent	  represent	  a	  valuable	  asset.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  patenting	  on	  the	  diffusion	  of	  climate	  change	  related	  technologies	  has	  recently	  become	  a	  subject	  of	  significant	  debate.	  It	  is	  certainly	  true	  that,	  conditional	  on	  
an	  innovation	  having	  taken	  place,	  one	  would	  expect	  technology	  diffusion	  to	  be	  slower	  when	  IPR	  is	  in	  place,	  because	  monopoly	  power	  implies	  that	  the	  price	  of	  clean	  technologies	  will	  be	  higher.	  The	  role	  of	  demand	  for	  clean	  technologies	  cannot	  be	  overstated,	  however,	  and	  is	  consistent	  with	  results	  found	  elsewhere.	  In	  an	  oft-­‐cited	  study	  on	  the	  role	  of	  intellectual	  property	  on	  pharmaceuticals,	  Attaran	  and	  Gillespie-­‐White	  (2001)	  ask	  whether	  patents	  constrain	  access	  to	  AIDS	  treatments	  in	  Africa.	  They	  find	  that,	  even	  in	  African	  countries	  where	  patent	  protection	  is	  possible,	  few	  AIDS	  drugs	  are	  patented	  as	  the	  markets	  for	  such	  drugs	  are	  too	  small	  to	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  multinational	  pharmaceutical	  companies.	  Rather	  than	  patents,	  they	  conclude	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  income,	  national	  regulatory	  requirements,	  and	  insufficient	  international	  aid	  are	  the	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main	  barriers	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  AIDS	  treatments	  in	  Africa.	  Similarly,	  with	  green	  technologies,	  one	  would	  expect	  demand	  (or	  the	  lack	  thereof)	  for	  clean	  technologies	  to	  be	  a	  primary	  constraint	  on	  international	  technology	  diffusion.	  The	  strengthening	  of	  environmental	  regulation	  across	  Europe	  is	  an	  important	  pre-­‐condition	  to	  the	  diffusion	  of	  eco-­‐innovations.	  Calls	  to	  weaken	  IPR	  for	  eco-­‐innovations	  would	  likely	  have	  little	  impact	  on	  their	  diffusion.	  	  	  
Support	  to	  private	  R&D	  Another	  way	  for	  governments	  to	  help	  firms	  internalize	  the	  knowledge	  externalities	  associated	  with	  innovation	  is	  to	  directly	  subsidize	  firms	  for	  their	  innovation	  activities,	  through	  technology	  prizes,	  research	  grants	  (such	  as	  the	  public	  R&D	  funding	  discussed	  earlier)	  or	  R&D	  tax	  credits.	  In	  theory,	  subsidies	  to	  private	  R&D	  activities	  should	  reflect	  the	  size	  of	  the	  external	  spillovers	  from	  the	  research	  (Goulder	  and	  Schneider,	  1999).	  	  Evidence	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  R&D	  tax	  credits	  is	  mixed.	  Bloom	  et	  al.	  (2002)	  find	  evidence	  that	  tax	  incentives	  are	  effective	  in	  increasing	  R&D	  intensity.	  They	  estimate	  that	  a	  10%	  fall	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  R&D	  stimulates	  a	  1%	  rise	  in	  the	  level	  of	  R&D	  in	  the	  short-­‐run,	  and	  a	  10%	  rise	  in	  R&D	  in	  the	  long-­‐run.	  More	  recently,	  Duguet	  (2010)	  and	  Czarnitzki	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  also	  find	  evidence	  that	  R&D	  tax	  credits	  lead	  to	  additional	  innovation	  output.	  Lokshin	  and	  Mohnen	  (2012)	  find	  that	  small	  firms	  (below	  200	  employees)	  have	  a	  larger	  cost	  elasticity	  of	  R&D	  than	  larger	  firms.	  One	  caveat	  is	  that	  the	  studies	  mentioned	  all	  study	  R&D	  subsidies	  or	  tax	  credits	  more	  generally,	  rather	  than	  R&D	  tax	  credits	  designed	  to	  promote	  renewables.	  Compared	  to	  direct	  public	  funding	  of	  R&D,	  firms	  applying	  for	  R&D	  tax	  credits	  retain	  control	  over	  the	  type	  of	  R&D	  projects	  they	  pursue.	  Thus,	  while	  tax	  credits	  may	  make	  marginal	  projects	  profitable,	  firms	  will	  still	  focus	  on	  projects	  with	  the	  greatest	  short-­‐run	  returns	  (David	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  As	  such,	  tax	  credits	  may	  not	  be	  the	  best	  policy	  tool	  to	  promote	  new	  technologies	  that	  are	  not	  close	  to	  the	  market.	  Williams	  (2012)	  provides	  a	  review	  of	  recent	  research	  on	  technology	  prizes.	  One	  failed	  example	  is	  a	  prize	  offered	  by	  a	  group	  of	  U.S.	  electric	  utilities	  for	  an	  energy	  efficient	  refrigerator.	  While	  Whirlpool	  was	  able	  to	  develop	  a	  refrigerator	  meeting	  the	  required	  technical	  specifications,	  the	  model	  was	  not	  popular	  with	  consumers,	  and	  thus	  Whirlpool	  did	  not	  sell	  the	  necessary	  number	  of	  units	  to	  receive	  the	  prize.	  This	  illustrates	  one	  of	  the	  challenges	  for	  using	  prizes	  for	  promoting	  new	  energy	  technologies,	  as	  the	  risk	  of	  failure	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is	  borne	  by	  companies,	  rather	  than	  government.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  technologies	  for	  which	  consumer	  demand	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  low,	  monetary	  prizes	  will	  need	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  large	  to	  entice	  firms	  to	  take	  on	  these	  risks.	  	  	  	  
C.	  The	  problem	  of	  crowding-­‐out	  non-­‐clean	  innovation	  	  An	  important	  question	  for	  the	  macroeconomic	  impact	  of	  policies	  supporting	  clean	  technologies	  is	  whether	  policy-­‐induced	  innovation	  activities	  in	  clean	  technologies	  come	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  innovation	  in	  other	  technologies.	  This	  question	  of	  crowding	  out	  is	  raised	  in	  two	  recent	  simulations	  of	  climate	  policy.	  Using	  the	  ENTICE	  model,	  Popp	  (2004)	  begins	  with	  a	  base	  case	  that	  assumes	  one-­‐half	  of	  new	  energy	  R&D	  crowds	  out	  other	  R&D.	  In	  this	  case,	  induced	  innovation	  increases	  welfare	  by	  9%.	  Assuming	  no	  crowding	  out	  increases	  the	  welfare	  gains	  from	  induced	  innovation	  to	  as	  much	  as	  45%,	  while	  assuming	  full	  crowding	  of	  R&D	  reduces	  welfare	  gains	  to	  as	  little	  as	  2%.	  Gerlagh	  (2008)	  extends	  this	  work	  by	  separately	  modeling	  the	  choice	  of	  carbon-­‐energy	  producing	  R&D,	  carbon-­‐energy	  saving	  R&D,	  and	  neutral	  R&D.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  it	  is	  carbon-­‐producing	  R&D,	  rather	  than	  neutral	  R&D,	  that	  is	  crowded	  out	  by	  induced	  carbon-­‐energy	  saving	  R&D.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  impact	  of	  induced	  technological	  change	  is	  larger,	  with	  optimal	  carbon	  taxes	  falling	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  2.	  	  Thus,	  an	  important	  question	  is	  what	  types	  of	  R&D	  are	  replaced	  by	  an	  increased	  focus	  on	  clean	  technologies.	  Recent	  research,	  highlighted	  in	  box	  6,	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  evidence	  for	  a	  crowding	  out	  effect,	  but	  that	  clean	  innovations	  tend	  to	  crowd	  out	  dirty	  innovations	  in	  the	  same	  sector.	  These	  results	  imply	  that	  the	  complementarity	  between	  technology	  policies	  and	  environmental	  policies	  is	  key	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  that	  clean	  innovation	  activity	  comes	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  innovation	  in	  dirty	  technologies	  and	  not	  of	  other	  socially	  valuable	  innovation.	  	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  any	  policy	  effort	  to	  accelerate	  innovation	  in	  clean	  technologies	  include	  a	  component	  to	  train	  new	  scientists	  and	  technical	  workers	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  supply	  of	  qualified	  scientists	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  As	  an	  example,	  consider	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  U.S.	  National	  Institutes	  of	  Health	  (NIH),	  which	  supports	  biomedical	  research	  in	  the	  U.S.	  The	  NIH	  budget	  has	  traditionally	  grown	  at	  a	  slow,	  steady	  pace.	  However,	  between	  1998-­‐2003,	  annual	  NIH	  spending	  nearly	  doubled,	  from	  $14	  billion	  to	  $27	  billion.	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Adjusted	  for	  inflation,	  this	  represents	  a	  76%	  in	  just	  five	  years,	  and	  was	  nearly	  twice	  as	  high	  as	  the	  increase	  for	  the	  entire	  decade	  before.	  This	  rapid	  increase	  resulted	  in	  high	  adjustment	  costs.	  New	  post-­‐doctorate	  researchers	  needed	  to	  be	  brought	  in	  to	  support	  research	  projects.	  Managing	  a	  larger	  budget	  entails	  administrative	  costs	  for	  NIH.	  Moreover,	  after	  this	  rapid	  doubling,	  research	  funds	  were	  cut,	  so	  that	  real	  NIH	  spending	  was	  6.6%	  lower	  in	  2007	  than	  in	  2004.	  This	  created	  a	  career	  crisis	  for	  the	  same	  post-­‐doctorate	  researchers	  supported	  by	  the	  earlier	  doubling	  of	  support,	  as	  there	  was	  more	  competition	  for	  funds	  to	  start	  their	  own	  research	  projects.	  Moreover,	  scientists	  spent	  more	  time	  writing	  grant	  proposals.	  Because	  the	  probability	  of	  funding	  for	  any	  one	  proposal	  falls	  as	  the	  NIH	  budget	  falls,	  researchers	  submitted	  multiple	  proposals	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  one	  would	  succeed	  (Freeman	  and	  Van	  Reenen,	  2009).	  This	  NIH	  experience	  suggests	  that	  growth	  in	  clean	  R&D	  budgets	  should	  be	  slow	  and	  steady,	  allowing	  time	  for	  the	  development	  of	  young	  researchers	  in	  the	  field.	  The	  training	  of	  new	  scientists	  through	  graduate	  and	  post-­‐graduate	  grants	  should	  be	  an	  important	  component	  of	  the	  overall	  public	  research	  funding	  approach.	  	  	  
Box	  6	  –	  Crowding-­‐out	  non-­‐clean	  innovation	  A	  few	  empirical	  papers	  have	  addressed	  the	  question	  of	  crowding-­‐out	  of	  environmental	  R&D.	  Gray	  and	  Shadbegian	  (1998)	  find	  that	  more	  stringent	  air	  and	  water	  regulations	  had	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  paper	  mills’	  technological	  choice	  in	  the	  US,	  but	  that	  the	  increased	  investment	  on	  abatement	  technologies	  came	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  other	  types	  of	  productivity-­‐improving	  innovation.	  Hottenrott	  and	  Rexhaüser	  (2013)	  find	  that	  regulation-­‐induced	  environmental	  innovation	  crowds	  out	  R&D	  in	  other	  technologies,	  especially	  for	  small	  firm	  that	  are	  credit	  constrained.	  Popp	  and	  Newell	  (2012)	  use	  patent	  and	  R&D	  data	  to	  examine	  both	  the	  private	  and	  social	  opportunity	  costs	  of	  climate	  R&D.	  Looking	  first	  at	  R&D	  spending	  across	  industries,	  they	  find	  that	  funds	  for	  energy	  R&D	  do	  not	  come	  from	  other	  sectors,	  but	  may	  come	  from	  a	  redistribution	  of	  research	  funds	  in	  sectors	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  perform	  energy	  R&D.	  Given	  this,	  they	  link	  firm-­‐level	  patent	  and	  financial	  data	  to	  take	  a	  detailed	  look	  at	  climate	  R&D	  in	  two	  sectors	  –	  alternative	  energy	  and	  automotive	  manufacturing	  –	  asking	  whether	  an	  increase	  in	  alternative	  energy	  patents	  leads	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  other	  types	  of	  patenting	  activity.	  They	  find	  evidence	  of	  crowding	  out.	  Interestingly,	  the	  patents	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  crowded	  out	  by	  alternative	  energy	  research	  are	  innovations	  enhancing	  the	  productivity	  of	  fossil	  fuels,	  such	  as	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energy	  refining	  and	  exploration.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  any	  apparent	  crowding	  out	  reacts	  to	  market	  incentives	  –	  as	  opportunities	  for	  alternative	  energy	  research	  become	  more	  profitable,	  research	  opportunities	  for	  traditional	  fossil	  fuels	  appear	  less	  appealing	  to	  firms.	  This	  is	  also	  in	  line	  with	  the	  result	  by	  Aghion	  et	  al	  (2012)	  which	  shows	  that	  automobile	  companies	  react	  to	  increases	  in	  fuel	  prices	  by	  conducting	  more	  innovation	  in	  “clean”	  cars	  (electric,	  hybrid	  and	  hydrogen)	  and	  less	  innovation	  in	  “dirty”	  (combustion	  engine)	  cars.	  Thus,	  while	  evidence	  of	  crowding	  out	  exists,	  those	  studies	  that	  are	  able	  to	  detail	  the	  types	  of	  R&D	  crowded	  out	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  dirty	  R&D	  that	  is	  reduced	  to	  make	  way	  for	  policy-­‐induced	  clean	  R&D.	  	  	  
D.	  The	  appropriate	  policy	  mix	  	  
Combining	  instruments	  The	  presence	  of	  several	  market	  failures	  requires	  the	  implementation	  of	  several	  policy	  instruments.	  Technology	  policies	  alone	  are	  irrelevant:	  if	  no	  carbon	  pricing	  is	  in	  place	  to	  create	  a	  market	  demand	  for	  technologies	  like	  CCS,	  no	  R&D	  will	  be	  conducted	  even	  with	  large	  research	  subsidies	  in	  place.	  Similarly,	  environmental	  policy	  cannot	  supplant	  the	  need	  for	  technology	  policy.	  Indeed,	  studies	  evaluating	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  various	  policy	  options	  find	  that	  environmental	  and	  technology	  policies	  work	  best	  in	  tandem.	  Although	  technology	  policy	  can	  help	  facilitate	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  environmentally	  friendly	  technologies,	  it	  provides	  little	  incentive	  to	  adopt	  these	  technologies.	  For	  example,	  Popp	  (2006b)	  considers	  the	  long-­‐run	  welfare	  gains	  from	  both	  an	  optimally	  designed	  carbon	  tax	  (one	  equating	  the	  marginal	  benefits	  of	  carbon	  reductions	  with	  the	  marginal	  costs	  of	  such	  reductions)	  and	  optimally	  designed	  R&D	  subsidies.	  While	  combining	  both	  policies	  yields	  the	  largest	  welfare	  gain,	  a	  policy	  using	  only	  the	  carbon	  tax	  achieves	  95%	  of	  the	  welfare	  gains	  of	  the	  combined	  policy,	  whereas	  a	  policy	  using	  only	  the	  optimal	  R&D	  subsidy	  attains	  just	  11%	  of	  the	  welfare	  gains	  of	  the	  combined	  policy	  in	  his	  model.	  While	  this	  model	  is	  a	  stylized	  representation	  of	  the	  global	  economy,	  and	  thus	  ignored	  barriers	  to	  diffusion	  such	  as	  those	  discussed	  in	  box	  3,	  it	  does	  highlight	  the	  key	  lesson	  that	  developing	  new	  clean	  technologies	  without	  providing	  incentives	  to	  use	  them	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient.	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Fischer	  &	  Newell	  (2008)	  use	  a	  micro	  approach	  to	  study	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  policies,	  including	  those	  encouraging	  technology	  adoption,	  to	  assess	  policies	  for	  reducing	  CO2	  emissions	  and	  promoting	  innovation	  and	  diffusion	  of	  renewable	  energy.	  Although	  the	  relative	  cost	  of	  individual	  policies	  in	  achieving	  emission	  reductions	  depends	  on	  parameter	  values	  and	  the	  emission	  target,	  in	  a	  numerical	  application	  to	  the	  U.S.	  electricity	  sector,	  they	  find	  the	  ranking	  is	  roughly	  as	  follows:	  (a)	  emission	  pricing	  (b)	  emission	  performance	  standard,	  (c)	  fossil	  power	  tax,	  (d)	  renewables	  share	  requirement,	  (e)	  renewables	  subsidy,	  and	  (f)	  R&D	  subsidy.9	  Nonetheless,	  an	  optimal	  portfolio	  of	  policies—including	  emission	  pricing	  and	  R&D—achieves	  emission	  reductions	  at	  significantly	  lower	  cost	  than	  any	  single	  policy	  (see	  Figure	  5).	  The	  benefits	  from	  more	  R&D	  are	  even	  able	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  carbon	  tax.	  Gerlagh	  and	  van	  der	  Zwaan	  (2006)	  find	  an	  emission	  performance	  standard	  to	  be	  the	  cheapest	  policy	  for	  achieving	  various	  carbon	  stabilization	  goals.	  They	  note	  that	  the	  ordering	  of	  policies	  depends	  on	  the	  assumed	  returns	  to	  scale	  of	  renewable	  energy	  technologies.	  Fischer	  &	  Newell	  (2008)	  assume	  greater	  decreasing	  returns	  to	  renewable	  energy,	  due	  to	  the	  scarcity	  of	  appropriate	  sites	  for	  new	  renewable	  sources.	  Thus,	  an	  important	  question	  raised	  by	  Gerlagh	  and	  van	  der	  Zwaan	  (2006)	  is	  whether	  the	  cost	  savings	  from	  innovation	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  overcome	  decreasing	  returns	  to	  scale	  for	  renewable	  energy	  resulting	  from	  limited	  space	  for	  new	  solar	  and	  wind	  installations.	  	  
Figure	  5	  –	  Cost	  of	  climate	  change	  policy	  under	  different	  policy	  scenarios	  
	  Source:	  Fischer,	  C.	  and	  R.G.	  Newell.	  2008.	  Environmental	  and	  Technology	  Policies	  for	  Climate	  Mitigation,	  Journal	  of	  Environmental	  Economics	  and	  Management	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Note	  that	  the	  analysis	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  power	  sector—presumably	  an	  economy-­‐wide	  carbon	  price	  would	  be	  a	  lot	  more	  cost	  effective	  relative	  to	  other	  policies	  like	  renewable	  subsidies.	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What	  is	  the	  optimal	  policy	  mix	  between	  technology-­‐push	  and	  demand-­‐pull?	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  depends	  on	  the	  relative	  intensity	  of	  market	  failures	  associated	  with	  technology	  development,	  mainly	  knowledge	  spillovers	  and	  learning-­‐by-­‐doing.	  Recent	  papers	  attempt	  to	  disentangle	  the	  separate	  contributions	  of	  R&D	  and	  experience	  by	  estimating	  two-­‐factor	  learning	  curves	  for	  environmental	  technologies.	  These	  two-­‐factor	  curves	  model	  cost	  reductions	  as	  a	  function	  of	  both	  experience	  (learning-­‐by-­‐doing,	  or	  LBD)	  and	  R&D	  (learning-­‐by-­‐searching,	  or	  LBS).	  Söderholm	  and	  Sundqvist	  (2007)	  find	  LBD	  rates	  around	  5	  percent,	  and	  LBS	  rates	  around	  15	  percent,	  suggesting	  that	  R&D,	  rather	  than	  learning-­‐by-­‐doing,	  contributes	  more	  to	  cost	  reductions.	  However,	  these	  results	  are	  very	  sensitive	  to	  the	  model	  specification,	  illustrating	  the	  difficulty	  of	  sorting	  through	  the	  various	  channels	  through	  which	  costs	  may	  fall	  over	  time.	  Nemet	  (2006)	  uses	  simulation	  techniques	  to	  decompose	  cost	  reductions	  for	  PV	  cells	  into	  seven	  categories.	  Plant	  size	  (e.g.	  returns	  to	  scale),	  efficiency	  improvements,	  and	  lower	  silicon	  costs	  explain	  the	  majority	  of	  cost	  reductions.	  Notably,	  most	  of	  the	  major	  improvements	  in	  efficiency	  come	  from	  universities,	  where	  traditional	  learning	  by	  doing	  through	  production	  experience	  would	  not	  be	  a	  factor.	  Learning	  from	  experience	  (e.g.	  through	  increased	  yield	  of	  PV	  cells)	  plays	  a	  much	  smaller	  role,	  accounting	  for	  just	  10	  percent	  of	  the	  cost	  decreases	  in	  Nemet’s	  sample.	  	  Fischer,	  Newell	  &	  Preonas	  (2013)	  model	  the	  US	  energy	  system	  and	  determine	  the	  optimal	  distribution	  of	  public	  spending	  between	  R&D	  support	  and	  deployment	  under	  various	  scenarios.	  They	  find	  that	  the	  ratio	  of	  deployment	  spending	  to	  R&D	  spending	  does	  not	  exceed	  one	  for	  wind	  energy	  in	  almost	  all	  scenarios.	  With	  extreme	  assumptions	  on	  learning-­‐by-­‐doing	  this	  ratio	  goes	  to	  6.5.	  The	  ratio	  of	  public	  spending	  on	  deployment	  to	  R&D	  exceeds	  one	  for	  solar	  energy	  but	  not	  by	  much.	  The	  ratio	  reaches	  10-­‐to-­‐1	  under	  the	  “high	  learning-­‐by-­‐doing”	  scenario.	  As	  one	  can	  see,	  the	  optimal	  policy	  mix	  varies	  across	  clean	  technologies,	  depending	  on	  their	  degree	  of	  maturity.	  The	  relative	  importance	  of	  market	  pull	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  technology	  push	  decreases,	  as	  one	  moves	  from	  technologies	  close	  to	  market	  competitiveness	  towards	  highly	  immature	  ones	  (Grubb,	  2004).	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  develop	  a	  model	  of	  endogenous	  growth	  with	  clean	  and	  dirty	  technologies	  and	  characterize	  the	  optimal	  climate	  change	  policy.	  They	  show	  that	  the	  transition	  to	  clean	  technology	  is	  slow	  when	  dirty	  technologies	  are	  initially	  more	  advanced.	  They	  find	  that	  the	  optimal	  policy	  includes	  a	  very	  aggressive	  research	  subsidy	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for	  clean	  technology.	  With	  a	  1%	  social	  discount	  rate,	  the	  optimal	  carbon	  tax	  is	  fairly	  low,	  (representing	  16%	  of	  the	  turnover	  of	  the	  carbon	  emitting	  sector),	  while	  research	  directed	  at	  clean	  technologies	  receives	  a	  61%	  government	  subsidy	  (meaning	  that	  for	  every	  dollar	  of	  R&D	  spending,	  there	  is	  a	  61	  cents	  subsidy).	  With	  a	  social	  discount	  rate	  of	  0.1%,	  carbon	  taxes	  are	  raised	  to	  44%,	  but	  clean	  research	  subsidies	  are	  even	  more	  aggressive,	  at	  95%.	  Moreover	  they	  show	  that	  relying	  only	  on	  carbon	  taxes	  and	  not	  on	  research	  subsidies	  leads	  to	  large	  welfare	  losses.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  result	  by	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  which	  shows	  that	  optimal	  policy	  involves	  both	  carbon	  taxes	  and	  research	  subsidies,	  so	  that	  excessive	  use	  of	  carbon	  taxes	  can	  be	  avoided.	  	  	  
Optimal	  public	  R&D	  funding	  An	  important	  question	  for	  policy	  makers	  is	  how	  much	  government	  R&D	  money	  to	  spend	  on	  environment-­‐friendly	  innovation.	  Here,	  however,	  economics	  provides	  less	  of	  an	  answer.	  Cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  provides	  a	  useful	  tool	  for	  ex-­‐post	  evaluation	  of	  R&D	  spending,	  but	  estimating	  the	  potential	  benefits	  from	  new	  R&D	  spending	  is	  more	  difficult.	  Engineers	  are	  better	  suited	  to	  determine	  which	  projects	  are	  most	  deserving	  from	  a	  technical	  standpoint.	  Given	  the	  need	  for	  a	  diversified	  energy	  portfolio	  to	  address	  climate	  change,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  there	  would	  not	  be	  enough	  deserving	  technologies	  for	  the	  research	  funding	  available.	  Rather,	  as	  suggested	  above,	  economic	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  constraints	  for	  funding	  are	  likely	  to	  come	  from	  other	  sources,	  such	  as	  what	  is	  the	  pool	  of	  scientist	  and	  engineering	  personnel	  currently	  available	  to	  work	  on	  energy	  projects,	  and	  how	  quickly	  can	  we	  grow	  this	  pool.	  That	  is,	  the	  limits	  to	  how	  much	  we	  can	  spend	  come	  not	  from	  the	  number	  of	  deserving	  projects,	  but	  rather	  limits	  of	  the	  existing	  research	  infrastructure.	  It	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out,	  however,	  than	  recent	  models	  of	  climate	  policy	  show	  that	  the	  optimal	  policy	  heavily	  relies	  on	  research	  subsidies.	  For	  example,	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  suggest	  that	  90%	  of	  all	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  clean	  technologies	  should	  be	  funded	  by	  the	  government	  during	  a	  couple	  of	  decades,	  so	  that	  the	  productivity	  of	  clean	  technologies	  quickly	  catches	  up	  with	  that	  of	  dirty	  technologies.	  Moreover,	  recent	  IEA	  estimates	  suggest	  that	  achieving	  global	  energy	  and	  climate	  change	  ambitions	  consistent	  with	  a	  50%	  reduction	  of	  energy-­‐related	  CO2	  emissions	  in	  2050	  with	  respect	  to	  2007	  (the	  2010	  BLUE	  Map	  scenario)	  would	  require	  a	  twofold	  to	  fivefold	  increase	  in	  public	  RD&D	  spending	  (IEA,	  2010).	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As	  regards	  what	  sorts	  of	  technologies	  should	  be	  priority	  for	  funding,	  European	  governments	  should	  focus	  on	  technologies	  have	  a	  strong	  public	  good	  component	  but	  are	  central	  to	  any	  decarbonisation	  pathway.	  	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  avoid	  providing	  public	  support	  for	  research	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  would	  otherwise	  do	  on	  their	  own.	  	  This	  could	  include	  projects	  supporting	  long-­‐term	  research	  needs	  where	  the	  payoff	  occurs	  farther	  into	  the	  future,	  as	  well	  as	  infrastructure	  that	  has	  a	  public	  goods	  component.	  	  Examples	  include	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage,	  energy	  storage,	  smart	  grids,	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  infrastructures	  for	  electric	  vehicles.	  	  	  
III. Current	  policies	  for	  clean	  technology	  development	  in	  Europe	  	  
A.	  Policies	  targeting	  environmental	  externalities	  	  The	  European	  Union	  Emissions	  Trading	  System	  is	  Europe’s	  flagship	  policy	  to	  address	  climate	  change.	  Beginning	  with	  an	  overall	  cap	  on	  EU	  carbon	  emissions,	  the	  EU	  sets	  a	  national	  CO2	  emissions	  limit	  for	  each	  country.	  From	  this,	  the	  EU	  specifies	  economic	  activities	  (such	  as	  burning	  of	  fuel	  or	  production	  of	  cement)	  that	  participate	  in	  trading	  of	  carbon	  permits10.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  EU	  ETS	  covers	  around	  45%	  of	  the	  EU's	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.	  As	  with	  any	  environmental	  policy,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  EU-­‐ETS	  on	  innovation	  depends	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  policy.	  Indeed,	  Calel	  and	  Dechezleprêtre	  (2014)	  show	  that	  the	  large	  positive	  impact	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  on	  low-­‐carbon	  innovation	  coincided	  with	  the	  time	  at	  which	  carbon	  prices	  were	  highest	  at	  around	  25-­‐35€/tonne.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  EU	  ETS	  has	  been	  plagued	  from	  the	  beginning	  by	  overallocation	  of	  permits	  (or	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  price	  stability	  mechanism).	  In	  addition,	  the	  economic	  downturn	  and	  the	  resulting	  contraction	  of	  production	  reduced	  industrial	  carbon	  emissions.	  As	  a	  result,	  permit	  prices	  are	  far	  below	  the	  level	  required	  to	  provide	  meaningful	  incentives	  for	  companies	  to	  invest	  in	  low	  carbon	  technology	  development,	  with	  the	  price	  of	  futures	  on	  the	  European	  carbon	  market	  now	  at	  a	  record	  low	  (around	  5€/tonne,	  see	  Figure	  6),	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Activity-­‐specific	  size	  criteria	  then	  determine	  which	  installations	  are	  included	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  For	  instance,	  only	  combustion	  installations	  with	  a	  yearly	  thermal	  input	  exceeding	  20	  MWh	  are	  covered.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  data	  on	  non-­‐regulated	  installations	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  determine	  fraction	  of	  emissions	  is	  produced	  by	  installations	  with	  input	  less	  than	  20	  MWh.	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Figure	  6	  –	  EUA	  Futures	  prices	  2005-­‐2014	  	  
	  Source:	  Intercontinental	  Exchange	  	  According	  to	  recent	  analysis	  by	  Thomson	  Reuters	  Point	  Carbon11,	  the	  European	  carbon	  market	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	  oversupplied	  with	  allowances	  for	  many	  years	  to	  come,	  despite	  the	  recent	  commitment	  to	  reduce	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  by	  40	  percent	  in	  2030	  because	  of	  the	  accumulated	  oversupply	  in	  the	  market,	  which	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  in	  the	  order	  of	  2.5	  Gt	  in	  2020.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  carbon	  prices	  are	  expected	  to	  remain	  low,	  at	  an	  average	  of	  €13/tonne	  between	  2015	  and	  2020	  and	  an	  average	  of	  €24/tonne	  from	  2021	  to	  2030.	  	  Thus,	  carbon	  prices	  are	  likely	  to	  remain	  at	  a	  low	  level	  for	  the	  next	  decade	  or	  so,	  and	  are	  unlikely	  to	  provide	  companies	  with	  strong	  incentives	  to	  conduct	  low-­‐carbon	  R&D	  at	  the	  scale	  needed,	  especially	  since	  the	  EU	  ETS	  covers	  less	  than	  half	  of	  Europe’s	  emissions.	  Thus,	  policies	  to	  augment	  low	  carbon	  prices	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  spur	  innovation	  during	  the	  next	  decade.	  For	  example	  the	  UK	  introduced	  in	  2013	  a	  carbon	  price	  floor	  (CPF)	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starting	  at	  around	  £16	  per	  tonne	  of	  C02	  and	  projected	  to	  reach	  £30	  per	  tonne	  of	  C02	  in	  2020.	  The	  CPF	  is	  made	  up	  of	  the	  price	  of	  CO2	  from	  the	  EU	  ETS	  and	  the	  carbon	  price	  support	  (CPS)	  rate	  per	  tCO2,	  which	  ensures	  that	  the	  minimal	  price	  paid	  by	  power	  generator	  does	  not	  go	  below	  the	  CPF.	  The	  carbon	  price	  support	  rates	  for	  2013-­‐14	  is	  £4.94/t,	  rising	  to	  £9.55/t	  in	  2014-­‐15	  and	  £18.08/t	  in	  2015-­‐1016.	  The	  CPF	  is	  explicitly	  designed	  to	  provide	  an	  incentive	  to	  invest	  in	  low-­‐carbon	  power	  generation.	  Of	  course,	  the	  UK	  carbon	  price	  floor	  is	  environmentally	  ineffective,	  unless	  other	  European	  countries	  adopt	  similar	  policies	  or	  the	  ETS	  is	  supplemented	  by	  a	  price	  floor.	  At	  present,	  this	  is	  highly	  unlikely.	  	  	  
B.	  Technology	  policies	  	  
Public	  R&D	  support	  Public	  R&D	  spending	  plays	  a	  particularly	  important	  role	  in	  the	  energy	  sector.	  In	  2011,	  the	  last	  year	  for	  which	  both	  private	  and	  public	  energy	  R&D	  data	  are	  available,	  European	  industry	  spent	  around	  €7	  billion	  on	  energy	  R&D	  	  according	  to	  the	  EU	  Joint	  Research	  Centre	  on	  Industrial	  Investment	  and	  Innovation	  R&D	  Scoreboard	  2013	  (European	  Commission,	  2013),	  while	  European	  governments	  spent	  around	  €4	  billion,	  according	  to	  	  IEA	  public	  R&D	  data.	  Although	  public	  energy-­‐related	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  European	  countries	  have	  increased	  significantly	  since	  2005,	  after	  having	  stagnated	  at	  around	  €2bn/year	  for	  almost	  a	  decade,	  they	  are	  still	  30%	  below	  what	  they	  were	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  after	  the	  second	  oil	  shock.	  Moreover,	  while	  public	  R&D	  grew	  at	  an	  average	  annual	  rate	  of	  8%	  between	  2001	  and	  2011,	  it	  has	  seemingly	  started	  to	  decrease	  recently,	  perhaps	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  falling	  energy	  prices	  which	  makes	  the	  value	  of	  future	  energy	  savings	  smaller	  (see	  Figure	  7).	  Energy-­‐related	  expenditures	  account	  for	  4%	  of	  total	  government	  R&D	  in	  Europe,	  compared	  to	  over	  10%	  in	  198.	  Meanwhile,	  environment-­‐related	  expenditures	  account	  for	  2.5%	  of	  total	  government	  R&D.	  However,	  there	  are	  important	  differences	  across	  countries,	  with	  France	  and	  Germany	  spending	  around	  8%	  of	  their	  public	  R&D	  budgets	  on	  energy	  and	  environment	  issues,	  while	  the	  figure	  is	  only	  4%	  in	  the	  UK	  (see	  Figure	  8).	  Overall,	  energy	  and	  environment	  appear	  to	  lag	  behind	  other	  research	  priorities	  such	  as	  health,	  space	  exploration	  or	  defence	  (Figure	  9).	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Public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  in	  Europe	  represent	  less	  than	  0.1%	  of	  GDP	  in	  almost	  all	  European	  countries	  (see	  Figure	  10).	  	  	  	  
Figure	  7	  -­‐	  EU	  27	  public	  R&D	  spending	  in	  energy	  technologies	  (billion	  euros)	  
	  Source:	  IEA	  
	  
Figure	  8	  –	  Share	  of	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  towards	  energy	  and	  environment	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  Source:	  Eurostat	  
	  
Figure	  9	  –	  Distribution	  of	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  Europe	  across	  socio-­‐
economic	  objectives	  (2013)	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Energy	  covers	  the	  production,	  storage,	  transportation,	  distribution	  and	  usage	  of	  any	  type	  of	  energy	  and	  processes	  designed	  to	  increase	  efficiency	  in	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  energy.	  It	  includes	  Energy	  efficiency;	  The	  capture	  and	  storage	  of	  CO2;	  Sources	  of	  renewable	  energies;	  Nuclear	  fission	  and	  fusion;	  Hydrogen	  and	  gas.	  	  
	  
Figure	  10	  –	  Public	  R&D	  expenditures	  on	  energy	  as	  a	  share	  of	  GDP	  (2011)	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technologies	  covered	  by	  the	  EU	  Strategic	  Energy	  Technology	  Plan12	  in	  2010	  reached	  €2.26	  billion,	  out	  of	  which,	  €2.02	  billion	  were	  national	  funds	  and	  €0.24	  billion	  (or	  11%)	  were	  EU	  funds.	  A	  possible	  consequence	  of	  the	  primary	  involvement	  of	  national	  governments	  is	  the	  relatively	  low	  efforts	  dedicated	  to	  technologies	  that	  are	  further	  away	  from	  the	  market	  and	  have	  a	  very	  strong	  public	  good	  component,	  such	  as	  electricity	  grids	  and	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage.	  For	  example,	  in	  2010,	  public	  R&D	  investments	  in	  wind	  and	  PV	  were	  around	  €900	  million	  each,	  while	  for	  electricity	  grids	  and	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  (CCS)	  they	  were	  €323	  and	  €400	  million	  respectively	  (see	  Figure	  11).	  Yet,	  the	  financing	  needs	  of	  technology	  development,	  as	  described	  in	  the	  SET-­‐Plan	  roadmaps	  (European	  Commission,	  2009),	  have	  been	  established	  at	  €1-­‐1.5	  billion	  per	  year	  for	  CCS.	  Thus	  R&D	  support	  for	  CCS	  may	  be	  lower	  than	  what	  is	  socially	  desirable,	  especially	  given	  the	  potential	  for	  European	  CCS	  technologies	  to	  be	  deployed	  in	  China	  and	  other	  large	  industrializing	  countries.	  	  True,	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  limited	  funding	  available	  to	  support	  clean	  technology	  development,	  with	  its	  budget	  capped	  at	  1.05%	  of	  the	  EU-­‐27's	  Gross	  National	  Income.	  However,	  an	  interesting	  source	  of	  additional	  funding	  comes	  from	  the	  revenues	  from	  auctioned	  carbon	  permits.	  The	  European	  Union	  created	  the	  NER300	  programme,	  which	  was	  funded	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  300	  million	  emission	  allowances	  from	  the	  New	  Entrants'	  Reserve	  (NER)	  set	  up	  for	  the	  third	  phase	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  programme	  is	  to	  fund	  innovative	  demonstration	  projects	  in	  CCS	  and	  renewable	  energy.	  The	  allowances	  were	  sold	  on	  the	  carbon	  market	  and	  the	  money	  raised	  —	  €2.1	  bn	  EUR	  —	  is	  being	  made	  available	  to	  projects	  as	  they	  operate. As	  part	  of	  their	  deliberations	  on	  the	  EU’s	  Framework	  for	  Climate	  and	  Energy	  2020-­‐2030,	  European	  leaders	  recently	  mandated	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  successor	  programme	  to	  NER300,	  “NER400”,	  which	  would	  be	  initially	  endowed	  with	  400	  million	  carbon	  allowances.	  The	  new	  programme	  would	  raise	  over	  €9	  bn	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  carbon	  price	  of	  €23/tonne.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Since	  2008,	  the	  EU	  Strategic	  Energy	  Technology	  Plan	  (SET-­‐Plan)	  aims	  to	  accelerate	  energy	  technology	  development	  and	  deployment	  across	  Europe.	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  SET-­‐Plan	  has	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  large	  scale	  programs,	  called	  European	  Industrial	  Initiatives	  (EIIs),	  which	  bring	  together	  industry,	  the	  research	  community,	  the	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  European	  Commission	  in	  risk-­‐sharing	  partnerships	  aiming	  at	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  key	  energy	  technologies	  at	  the	  European	  level.	  Six	  technologies	  have	  been	  identified	  as	  the	  focal	  points	  of	  the	  first	  EIIs:	  wind,	  solar	  (photovoltaics	  and	  concentrated	  solar	  power),	  electricity	  grids,	  bioenergy,	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage,	  fuel	  cells	  and	  hydrogen	  and	  nuclear	  fission.	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The	  NER	  programmes	  are	  interesting	  in	  that	  the	  auctioned	  carbon	  permits	  provide	  a	  source	  of	  sustained	  revenues	  that	  can	  be	  used	  for	  R&D	  support,	  even	  though	  the	  price	  of	  permits	  is	  uncertain	  and	  volatile.	  In	  contrast,	  temporary	  support	  programmes	  to	  R&D	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  useful	  since,	  as	  explained	  above,	  R&D	  is	  by	  nature	  a	  long-­‐term	  activity	  that	  necessitates	  some	  guarantee	  of	  sustained	  support.	  For	  example	  in	  2009	  the	  European	  Commission	  implemented	  the	  European	  Energy	  Programme	  for	  Recovery	  (EEPR),	  which	  dedicated	  €4	  billion	  to	  co-­‐finance	  projects	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  gas	  and	  electricity	  infrastructure	  (€2.5	  billlion),	  offshore	  wind	  (€565	  million)	  and	  CCS	  (€1	  billion).	  To	  our	  knowledge	  all	  funded	  CCS	  projects	  have	  since	  then	  been	  abandoned	  because	  of	  the	  low	  carbon	  price	  on	  the	  market,	  suggesting	  that	  temporary	  R&D	  support	  programmes	  are	  of	  little	  help	  and	  can	  even	  be	  counterproductive	  if	  they	  divert	  resources	  away	  from	  sustained	  R&D	  efforts.	  	  	  
Figure	  11	  -­‐	  Estimate	  of	  public	  and	  corporate	  R&D	  by	  technology	  and	  source	  for	  the	  
6	  SET	  Plan	  technologies	  (2010)	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Figure 2a. Estimate of public and corporate R&D by technology and source (2010). EEPR funding is 
not incl ded.  
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Figure 2b. Shares of public and corporate R&D by technology and source (2010). EEPR funding is 
not included. 
 
In general, public investment in RD&D was lower than corporate investment. For 
the nuclear and the bioenergy sectors, the European Union (through FP7) provided 
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Along	  the	  NER	  programmes,	  national	  governments	  can	  use	  auctioning	  revenues	  to	  support	  public	  R&D.	  Under	  the	  revised	  EU	  ETS	  Directive,	  at	  least	  50	  %	  of	  auctioning	  revenues	  should	  be	  used	  by	  Member	  States	  for	  climate	  and	  energy	  related	  purposes.	  Under	  the	  Monitoring	  Mechanism	  Regulation,	  Member	  States	  are	  requested	  to	  report	  annually	  on	  the	  amounts	  and	  use	  of	  the	  revenues	  generated.	  In	  2013,	  the	  total	  auctioning	  revenues	  for	  EU	  countries	  reached	  €	  3.6	  billion.	  From	  this,	  around	  €	  3	  billion	  have	  been	  used	  for	  climate	  and	  energy	  related	  purposes	  according	  to	  the	  European	  Commission,	  of	  which	  only	  €256	  million	  (or	  7%)	  have	  been	  dedicated	  to	  research	  (European	  Commission,	  2014).	  Between	  2015	  and	  2020,	  around	  6	  billion	  allowances	  should	  be	  auctioned,	  or	  1	  billion	  per	  year	  on	  average.	  Thus,	  auctioning	  represents	  a	  potentially	  significant	  source	  of	  revenues	  to	  increase	  public	  R&D.	  For	  example,	  directing	  10%	  of	  the	  planned	  auctioned	  allowances	  revenues	  until	  2025	  to	  R&D	  funding	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  doubling	  of	  EU	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  10	  years,	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  observed	  between	  2000	  and	  2010.	  	  
Support	  to	  private	  research	  Many	  European	  countries	  have	  policies	  to	  subsidize	  private	  R&D	  expenditures.	  For	  example	  in	  France	  companies	  can	  deduct	  30%	  of	  all	  R&D	  expenditures	  from	  profit	  taxes.13	  Most	  of	  these	  policies	  are	  technology-­‐neutral,	  with	  a	  few	  exceptions.	  For	  example,	  Belgium	  has	  introduced	  a	  tax	  deduction	  of	  up	  to	  15.5	  percent	  of	  investments	  in	  R&D	  fixed	  assets	  if	  they	  have	  an	  environmental	  benefit.	  At	  the	  European	  level,	  some	  policies	  are	  in	  place	  to	  facilitate	  access	  to	  finance	  for	  innovative	  firms.	  In	  particular	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  European	  Investment	  Bank	  Group	  (EIB)	  have	  launched	  ‘InnovFin	  –	  EU	  Finance	  for	  Innovators’	  which	  includes	  guarantees	  for	  intermediaries	  that	  lend	  to	  SMEs,	  direct	  loans	  to	  enterprises	  and	  advisory	  services.	  This	  scheme	  is	  expected	  to	  support	  up	  to	  €48	  billion	  of	  final	  R&I	  investments.14	  The	  scheme	  is	  not	  targeted	  at	  any	  technology	  in	  particular,	  but	  is	  assuring	  financial	  support	  to	  the	  renewable	  energy	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  sectors.	  	  
Intellectual	  property	  rights	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  In	  2011	  this	  represented	  5	  billion	  euros	  in	  tax	  credits,	  i.e.	  1.1%	  of	  the	  government	  budget	  and	  0.2%	  of	  GDP.	  14	  http://setis.ec.europa.eu/energy-­‐research/content/eu-­‐and-­‐eib-­‐group-­‐jointly-­‐provide-­‐eur-­‐48-­‐billion-­‐ri-­‐investment-­‐support	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Europe	  has	  a	  well	  functioning	  patenting	  system.	  The	  European	  Patent	  Office	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  applicants	  to	  file	  a	  patent	  across	  all	  European	  countries.	  Yet	  because	  of	  legal	  and	  translation	  costs,	  the	  cost	  of	  filing	  a	  patent	  in	  Europe	  is	  still	  relatively	  high.	  In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  filing	  a	  patent	  cost	  around	  €5,000	  in	  Japan,	  €10,000	  in	  the	  US	  and	  €30,000	  at	  the	  European	  Patent	  Office	  (Roland	  Berger	  Market	  Research,	  2005).	  Since	  January	  2014,	  applicants	  can	  apply	  for	  a	  “unitary	  patent”	  across	  Europe	  which	  ensures	  uniform	  protection	  for	  an	  invention	  in	  25	  Member	  States	  (all	  EU	  Member	  States	  except	  Italy	  and	  Spain).	  The	  implementation	  of	  this	  new	  EU	  Patenting	  System	  is	  expected	  to	  substantially	  decrease	  patenting	  costs	  for	  innovators.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  patents	  are	  likely	  to	  provide	  useful	  incentives	  for	  innovation	  in	  European	  developed	  economies,	  but	  not	  so	  much	  in	  many	  sectors	  where	  environmental	  technologies	  are	  actually	  being	  developed.	  Hence,	  changes	  in	  IP	  rights	  (either	  strengthening	  or	  weakening)	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  induce	  significant	  changes	  in	  innovation	  activity	  except	  in	  a	  handful	  of	  sectors,	  including	  for	  example	  biotechnology.	  However,	  programmes	  to	  accelerate	  the	  examination	  of	  patents	  in	  clean	  technologies	  can	  be	  useful	  in	  helping	  start-­‐up	  companies	  raise	  capital.	  Because	  proving	  that	  a	  patent	  application	  does	  cover	  a	  “green”	  technology	  is	  difficult,	  we	  do	  not	  however	  recommend	  restricting	  fast-­‐track	  programmes	  to	  green	  patents	  only,	  but	  instead	  recommend	  they	  be	  open	  to	  all	  patent	  applications.	  	  	  
Deployment	  policies	  As	  of	  2011,	  every	  EU	  country	  has	  implemented	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  major	  support	  instruments	  towards	  renewable	  energy	  deployment	  (feed-­‐in	  tariffs,	  feed-­‐in	  premiums,	  tender	  schemes	  or	  quota	  obligations).	  Amongst	  the	  major	  support	  instruments,	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs	  schemes	  are	  clearly	  dominant,	  with	  85%	  of	  countries	  implementing	  it	  in	  2010	  (Kitzing	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Almost	  all	  countries	  have	  also	  implemented	  at	  least	  one	  supplementary	  support	  scheme:	  investment	  grants,	  fiscal	  measures	  (tax	  incentives,	  etc)	  or	  financing	  support	  (loans	  etc).	  Amongst	  the	  supplementary	  support	  instruments,	  investment	  grants	  dominate.	  	  Recent	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  European	  countries	  have	  put	  a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  deployment	  policies	  compared	  with	  direct	  R&D	  support.	  A	  study	  by	  Zachmann	  et	  al	  (2014)	  shows	  that	  the	  top	  6	  European	  countries	  spent	  315	  M€	  in	  2010	  to	  support	  R&D	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in	  wind	  and	  solar	  power.	  The	  cost	  to	  society	  implied	  by	  the	  deployment	  of	  wind	  and	  solar	  technologies15	  that	  same	  year	  represented	  48,300	  M€	  (see	  Figure	  12).	  	  
Figure	  12:	  Public	  support	  to	  RDD	  vs	  deployment	  in	  wind	  and	  solar	  energy	  in	  the	  
top	  6	  European	  countries	  (2010)	  
	  Source:	  Zachman	  et	  al	  2014	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  Technological	  advances	  will	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  efforts	  to	  stabilize	  atmospheric	  greenhouse	  gas	  concentration.	  As	  this	  paper	  demonstrates,	  well-­‐designed	  climate	  policy	  can	  help	  shape	  the	  development	  of	  environment-­‐friendly	  technologies.	  These	  policies	  must	  address	  multiple	  market	  failures	  pertaining	  to	  the	  environmental	  externalities	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions,	  knowledge	  spillovers,	  learning-­‐by-­‐doing,	  imperfections	  in	  capital	  markets	  and	  other	  barriers.	  This	  requires	  a	  menu	  of	  policy	  options.	  Simply	  providing	  R&D	  support	  is	  not	  sufficient,	  as	  without	  environmental	  policy,	  there	  is	  little	  incentive	  to	  adopt	  clean	  technologies.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  while	  broad-­‐based	  environmental	  policies	  such	  as	  a	  carbon	  tax	  or	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  scheme	  provide	  an	  overall	  framework	  for	  emission	  reductions,	  this	  review	  suggests	  that	  other	  market	  failures	  remain	  important.	  Private	  firms	  will	  focus	  on	  technologies	  most	  likely	  to	  generate	  short-­‐term	  profits.	  For	  instance,	  carbon	  taxes	  are	  likely	  to	  promote	  wind	  energy	  at	  the	  expense	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Net	  deployment	  costs	  are	  calculated	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  deployment	  costs	  and	  the	  net	  present	  value	  of	  the	  future	  electricity	  generated,	  so	  it	  does	  not	  only	  include	  direct	  support	  (e.g.	  loans,	  tax	  credits),	  but	  it	  also	  places	  a	  value	  on	  support	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  feed-­‐in-­‐tariffs	  and	  RPS.	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of	  solar,	  as	  wind	  is	  currently	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  renewable	  option.	  Similarly,	  because	  improving	  electricity	  transmission	  efficiency	  systems	  benefits	  all	  technologies,	  private	  innovators	  are	  likely	  able	  to	  capture	  only	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  the	  social	  benefits	  of	  such	  innovation.	  “Leaving	  it	  to	  the	  market"	  also	  picks	  a	  winner	  -­‐	  markets	  will	  emphasize	  the	  lowest	  cost	  technology,	  which	  might	  prevent	  the	  development	  of	  a	  broader	  portfolio	  of	  technologies.	  Long-­‐term	  benefits,	  spillovers,	  and	  uncertain	  R&D	  returns	  all	  suggest	  a	  role	  for	  public	  R&D	  support,	  either	  through	  direct	  financing	  or	  targeted	  policy	  incentives.	  Finally,	  once	  technologies	  are	  available,	  additional	  policy	  support	  is	  needed	  to	  encourage	  diffusion.	  As	  the	  research	  on	  the	  energy	  efficiency	  paradox	  shows,	  even	  energy	  innovations	  with	  relatively	  short	  payback	  periods	  diffuse	  slowly.	  This	  suggests	  that	  simply	  getting	  the	  prices	  right	  through	  policies	  such	  as	  a	  carbon	  tax	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient.	  	  As	  our	  review	  demonstrates,	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  national	  governments	  have	  adopted	  a	  set	  of	  policies	  to	  address	  these	  various	  market	  failures	  and	  lift	  the	  barriers	  to	  the	  development	  of	  clean	  technologies.	  These	  policies	  include	  the	  EU	  ETS,	  public	  R&D	  expenditures,	  support	  to	  private	  R&D	  and	  to	  start-­‐up	  companies,	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  IP	  system	  and	  a	  range	  of	  policies	  to	  encourage	  the	  deployment	  of	  renewable	  energy	  technologies.	  While	  these	  policies	  are	  encouraging	  and	  go	  in	  the	  right	  direction,	  we	  suspect	  that	  the	  very	  low	  price	  of	  carbon	  on	  the	  EU	  ETS,	  which	  is	  projected	  to	  remain	  so	  for	  another	  decade,	  along	  with	  its	  partial	  coverage,	  is	  a	  major	  barrier	  to	  clean	  technology	  development	  in	  Europe.	  The	  new	  commitments	  for	  2030	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Market	  Stability	  Reserve	  are	  steps	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  but	  didn't	  have	  any	  influence	  on	  the	  price	  so	  far	  because	  of	  the	  vast	  amount	  of	  allowances	  currently	  on	  the	  market.	  Combined	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  innovation	  market	  failures	  and	  political	  constraints	  on	  high	  emissions	  prices,	  this	  justifies	  stronger	  policies	  targeted	  directly	  at	  technology	  development.	  Here	  we	  propose	  a	  series	  of	  reforms	  to	  the	  current	  policy	  landscape	  that	  could	  enhance	  clean	  innovation	  activities	  in	  Europe	  and	  help	  European	  countries	  tackle	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  climate	  change	  and	  other	  environmental	  issues.	  	  
Some	  practical,	  recommended	  steps	  for	  reform	  	  (1)	  While	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  provide	  an	  "optimal"	  policy	  mix	  between	  R&D	  and	  deployment,	  it	  appears	  that	  European	  countries	  have	  been	  emphasizing	  technology	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deployment,	  in	  particular	  through	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs	  for	  renewable	  energy	  production,	  over	  direct	  R&D	  support.	  This	  suggests	  that	  current	  efforts	  on	  deployment	  should	  be	  augmented	  with	  additional	  R&D	  support,	  such	  that	  in	  line	  with	  the	  recommendations	  below	  the	  marginal	  euro	  spent	  on	  clean	  technologies	  should	  go	  to	  R&D	  rather	  than	  deployment.	  	  (2)	  Given	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  problem	  (and	  other	  environmental	  issues),	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  spent	  on	  R&D	  in	  clean	  technologies	  seems	  small,	  especially	  when	  compared	  with	  other	  equally	  important	  sectors	  such	  as	  health	  or	  defence.	  Public	  energy-­‐related	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  European	  countries	  are	  still	  30%	  below	  what	  they	  were	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  and	  have	  decreased	  recently.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  we’ve	  hit	  diminishing	  returns	  to	  energy	  R&D	  funding,	  so	  at	  this	  point	  it	  is	  macroeconomic	  constraints	  on	  available	  funding	  that	  limit	  increases.	  The	  IEA	  estimates	  that	  public	  RD&D	  spending	  need	  to	  at	  least	  double	  to	  achieve	  significant	  carbon	  emissions	  reductions.	  Thus,	  we	  recommend	  an	  increase	  of	  public	  R&D	  funding	  for	  low	  carbon	  technologies.	  	  	  (3)	  This	  increase	  in	  funding	  needs	  to	  be	  gradual,	  however,	  because	  the	  supply	  of	  researchers	  in	  the	  society	  is	  fixed	  in	  the	  short	  run	  and	  expanding	  research	  in	  clean	  technologies	  involves	  training	  new	  scientists	  to	  avoid	  crowding	  out	  other	  socially	  valuable	  R&D.	  Ephemeral	  increases	  in	  clean	  R&D	  funding,	  like	  the	  2009	  EEPR	  programme,	  can	  be	  counterproductive	  as	  they	  divert	  resources	  away	  from	  steady	  research	  programmes.	  A	  sustained	  8%	  annual	  increase	  in	  funding	  leading	  to	  a	  doubling	  of	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  10	  years	  corresponds	  to	  what	  was	  observed	  between	  2001	  and	  2011	  and	  thus	  seems	  achievable.	  	  (4)	  We	  think	  that	  commitments	  to	  fund	  R&D	  should	  have	  a	  long-­‐term	  component	  (until	  at	  least	  2030)	  just	  like	  carbon	  emission	  caps.	  Policy	  stability	  is	  important	  for	  companies,	  universities	  and	  other	  research	  stakeholders	  to	  make	  long-­‐term	  predictions	  on	  innovation	  needs.	  	  To	  provide	  a	  long-­‐term	  commitment,	  revenues	  from	  auctioned	  carbon	  permits	  could	  provide	  a	  source	  of	  sustained	  funding	  for	  low	  carbon	  R&D.	  	  Directing	  10%	  of	  the	  planned	  auctioned	  allowances	  revenues	  until	  2025	  to	  R&D	  funding	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  doubling	  of	  EU	  public	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  10	  years	  suggested	  above.	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The	  EU	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  a	  better	  position	  than	  individual	  European	  governments	  to	  make	  such	  long-­‐term	  R&D	  commitments.	  	  	  	  (5)	  EU	  institutions	  and	  governments	  should	  focus	  their	  efforts	  on	  technologies	  that	  are	  central	  to	  any	  decarbonisation	  pathway	  and	  have	  a	  strong	  public	  good	  component:	  CCS,	  energy	  storage,	  smart	  grids,	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  infrastructure	  for	  electric	  vehicles.	  Compared	  to	  wind	  and	  solar	  power,	  these	  technologies	  have	  received	  relatively	  less	  support.	  	  (6)	  The	  low	  price	  of	  carbon	  on	  the	  market,	  combined	  with	  uncertainty	  over	  future	  policies,	  may	  make	  regulatory	  instruments,	  such	  as	  technological	  standards,	  attractive.	  However,	  because	  standards	  –	  just	  like	  emissions	  permits	  markets	  –	  are	  likely	  to	  favour	  technologies	  that	  are	  closest	  to	  the	  market,	  they	  too	  should	  be	  used	  in	  combination	  with	  direct	  R&D	  support	  for	  technologies	  that	  have	  longer	  term	  potential.	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